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COFFEE AND BASIC GRAINS: 
A REVIEW OF SECTORAL PERFORMANCE, 
PRICING AND MARKETING MARGINS AND RECENT POLICY CHANGES 
Stephen K. Pollard 
Douglas H. Graham 
Carlos E. Cuevas 
INTRODUCTION 
It has long been recognized that agriculture makes an 
important contribution to the development process. It's 
contribution to the structural transformation that charac-
terizes modern economic growth has been summarized in four 
key functions: (1) the production of foodstuffs for the 
domestic market; (2) the accumulation of savings and capital 
for future growth; (3) the provision of a market for domesti-
cally produced inputs and consumer goods; and, (4) the supply 
of foreign exchange through export activity or successful 
import substitution in foodstuffs. 
This study documents and evaluates the performance of 
two important agricultural subsectors in fulfilling these 
functions, i.e. coffee and basic grains. The report analyzes 
the market performance and comments on the institutional 
framework conditioning the growth of these two subsectors. 
Emphasis here centers on evaluating the growth record and 
identifying policy implications seen in the structure of 
prices and marketing margins available through official price 
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data. Separate studies will analyze the role of IHCAFE in 
absorbing technical assistance and credit supervision costs 
in coffee sector loan activity and the differential prices 
and marketing conditions facing basic grains producers. 
I. THE COFFEE SECTOR 
l. Review of Growth Record 
Among the four major functions for agriculture mentioned 
above the coffee sector in Honduras has performed a creditable 
role in generating foreign exchange earnings in the recent 
period. This has in turn allowed the industrial sector to 
draw upon the increased import capacity made possible through 
this contribution. Coffee has thus contributed to the process 
of import-substitution activity in the economy. 
Tables 1 through 5 set forth the growth of domestic 
production, area, yields and exports for the sector for the past 
two decades. Tables 2 and 4 present the physical output, 
cultivated area, yields and exports (in quintales) from 1960 
to 1982, while Tables 3 and 5 transform these data into 
uniform indexes that permit one to view their differential 
growth over time. All these data came from the Economic 
Studies Division of the Central Bank and, in part, from IHCAFE. 
Table 1 conveniently summarizes the growth history of 
coffee for selected periods in the past two decades. Panel B 
indicates an average annual growth of output over this 22 
year period of 6.2 percent per year. Furthermore, the growth 
in coffee yields accounted for a relatively greater part of 
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Table 1: Average Annual Rates of Growth of 
Physical Output, Area and Yields 
for Coffee for Selected Periods in 
Honduras, 1960-82 
-Time Periods 
Crop Variable 1960-82 1960-70 1970-82 1970-76 19-76-82 
( 1) ( 2) (3) (4) (5) 
A. Calendar Year 
1. Coffee Production 6.26 5.40 6.86 9.25 4.81 
2. Domestic Coffee 2.28 3.26 1.60 3.41 0.04 
Consumption 
3. Coffee Exports 8.52 6.42 9.97 15.48 5.25 
B. Cro;e Year 
1 • Coffee Production 6.18 6.09 6.24 5.28 7.21 
2. Coffee Area 2.46 3.29 1. 84 1.19 1. 79 
3. Coffee Yields 3.71 3.02 4.21 3.35 5.07 
Source: Derived from basic data reported in tables 2 and 4. 
-4-
Table 2. Production, Consumption and Exports of/Coffee 
in Honduras, 1960-1982 (in quintales)l 
calendar- Domest~c - Domest~c Exports 
Year Production ConsumTtion (Col 1 - Col 2) 
( 1} (2 (3} 
1960 487,624 160,055 342,261 
1961 452,500 163,346 277,162 
1962 503,910 170,638 351,227 
1963 617,295 175,929 442,177 
1964 601,594 182,543 408,488 
1965 722,356 187,834 540,363 
1966 701,216 194,447 497,392 
1967 665,785 201,061 483,544 
1968 856,738 208,978 578,529 
1969 717,149 213,596 524,299 
1970 784,498 221,072 559,094 
1971 848,196 228,810 554,027 
1972 889,981 236,818 720,234 
1973 1,110,529 24217 38 878,550 
1974 1,082,841 251,234 680,792 
1975 1,199,426 261,283 1,073,717 
1976 1,175,852 268,599 953,719 
1977 1,127,273 273,971 792,340 
1978 1,483,208 278,081 1,267,716 
1979 1,646,000 212,000 1,456,000 
1980 1,599,000 215,000 1,253,000 
1981 1,601,000 244,000 1,484,000 
1982 1,600,000 251,000 1,266,000 
!./ One quintal equals one hundred pounds. 
Source: Central Bank of Honduras, Department of Economic 
Studies. 
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Table 3. Indices of Production, Consumption and Exports 
of Coffee in Honduras, 1960-1982. {1960 = 100) 
ca1endar ______ coffee _______ cotf'ee-----coffee-
Year __ Production Consumption Exports 
(1} (2) (3) 
1960 100.00 100.00 100.00 
1961 92.80 102.06 80.98 
1962 103.34 106.61 102.62 
1963 126.59 109.92 129.19 
1964 123.37 114.05 119.35 
1965 148.14 117.36 157.88 
1966 143.80 121.49 145.33 
1967 136.54 125.62 141.28 
1968 175.70 130.57 169.03 
1969 147.07 133.45 153.19 
1970 160.88 138.12 163.35 
1971 173.95 142.96 161.87 
1972 182.51 147.96 210.43 
1973 226.67 151.66 256.69 
1974 222.07 156.97 198.91 
1975 245.97 163.25 313.71 
1976 241.14 167.82 278.65 
1977 231.18 171.18 231.50 
1978 304.17 173.74 370.39 
1979 337.56 132.45 425.41 
1980 327.92 134.33 366.10 
1981 328.33 152.45 436.51 
1982 328.12 156.82 369.89 
Source: Table 2. 
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Table 4. Production, Area and Yields of Coffee 
in Honduras, 1960-1982. 
-------------· Yields 
Crop Product~on Area (Quinta1es 
Year (QQ)! (Manzanas)'!:../ ;eer Manzana) 
{ 1) (2) (3) 
1960/61 568,750 107,060 4.75 
1961/62 472,885 111,181 4.25 
1962/63 615,945 115,301 5. 34 
1963/64 639,650 119,421 5.36 
1964/65 645,425 123,542 5.22 
1965/66 709,894 115,670 6.14 
1966/67 740,200 133,314 5.55 
1967/68 772,649 136,088 5.68 
1968/69 805,098 138,862 5.80 
1969/70 837,547 141,636 5.91 
1970/71 848,300 144,410 5.87 
1971/72 890,100 147,184 6.05 
1972/73 1,110,070 149,958 7.41 
1973/74 1,083,000 145,710 7.43 
1974/75 1,099,600 155,506 7.07 
1975/76 1,117,800 158,280 7.06 
1976/77 1,499,999 161,054 9.31 
1977/78 1,350,000 163,828 8.24 
1978/79 1,599,300 164,439 9.73 
1979/80 1,415,899 175,696 8.06 
1980/81 1,657,633 175,696 9.43 
1981/82 1,574,349 175,696 8.96 
1/ Quinta1es (QQ). 11 One Manzana equals 1.8 acres or 0.7 hectares. 
Sources: Central Bank of Honduras, Department of 
Economic Studies and IHCAFE. 
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Table 5. Indices of Production, Area and Yields of 
Coffee in Honduras, 1960-1982. (1960 = 100) 
------
grop Year Production Area Yield 
( 1) (2) ( 3) 
1960/61 100.00 100.00 100.00 
1961/62 92.95 103.84 89.54 
1962/63 121.07 107.69 112.46 
1963/64 125.73 111.54 112.76 
1964/65 126.86 115.39 109.98 
1965/66 139.53 108.04 129.20 
1966/67 145.49 124.52 116.89 
1967/68 ].51.87 127.11 119.52 
1968/69 158.25 129.70 122.06 
1969/70 164.62 132.29 124.49 
1970/71 166.74 134.88 123.66 
1971/72 174.95 137.47 127.31 
1972/73 218.19 140.06 155.84 
1973/74 212.87 136.10 156.47 
1974/75 216.13 145.25 148.86 
1975/76 219.71 147.84 148.67 
1976/77 294.84 150.43 196.07 
1977/78 265.35 153.02 173.48 
1978/79 314.35 153.59 204.75 
1979/80 278.30 164.11 169.68 
1980/81 325.82 164.11 198.62 
1981/82 309.45 164.11 188.64 
Source: Table 4. 
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this growth than area expansion (Column 1, Panel B). It 
should be borne in mind that while Honduras records the 
lowest coffee yields of any Central American producer, 
within this low yield scenario, yields have improved and 
accounted for a greater proportion (i.e. recorded higher 
rates of growth) of total output than increases in cultivated 
area over this 22 year period. 
Panel B also underscores the fact that output and exports 
grew more rapidly in the 1970s than in the 1960s. Yields 
have also been increasing at an increasing rate from the 
1960s (3.02 percent) to the early 1970s (3.35 percent) to 
the late 1970s and early 1980s (5.07 percent). This pattern 
reflects the response to the coffee boom that swept Central 
America from the mid-1970s onwards following the massive 
frost that destroyed much of the traditional Brazilian 
supply to world markets in 1975 and 1976. It is of interest 
to note that increased yields played a much more critical 
role than increases in cultivated area in promoting the rapid 
growth of coffee output in the 1970s. In part this is due 
to starting from such a low yield base and, in part, due to 
the increased role of IHCAFE in promoting new varieties and 
practices from 1974 onwards. 
In the most recent period, however, from 1979 to 1982, 
indices from Tables 3 and 5 show that the growth of coffee 
production, exports and yields have flattened out. This 
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again reflects the overall decline in world coffee prices 
and the weakening of coffee export markets from 1978 to the 
present, along with an unfortunate decline in Honduras' 
coffee quota within the International Coffee Agreement, a fact 
that will be commented on later. From 1979 onwards the 
government has prohibited any further expansion in coffee 
area. 
As a result of the rapid growth in coffee exports from 
1970 to 1982 (almost 10 percent per year as can be seen in 
Panel A, line 3 of Table 1), this sector rapidly increased 
its relative role in generating foreign exchange earnings 
for the economy. The share of coffee export earnings in total 
~ 
export earning-increased from an average of 14 percent in 
the 1960s (Table 6, Column 1} to 25 percent in the mid-to 
late 1970s. 
This rapidly increasing role for coffee export earnings 
stands out in sharp contrast to the equally rapid deterioration 
of the relative share for bananas (Column 2, Table 6). Whereas 
banana earnings accounted for close to one-half of all export 
earnings in Honduras during the 1960s, (representing a contri-
bution 2 to 4 times that of coffee} , by the late 1970s it had 
fallen to a parity with coffee, accounting for roughly one-
quarter of total exports. Thus Honduras diversified its 
export portfolio in the 1970s with coffee, becoming the fastest 
growth component within the export portfolio. The recent 
decline in the share of banana exports can be largely attributed 
Table 6. Percentage Shares of Total Export Value for Major 
Export Commodities in Honduras, 1960-1982. 
Shrimp and 
Year Coffee Banana wood Silver Meat Cotton Lobster Sugar Zinc Tobacco 
( l) (2j ( 3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
1960 19.1% 45.5% 13.3% 3.7% 1.8% 1.1% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1961 12.5 54.4 10.4 4.0 2.1 .4 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1962 14.4 47.2 9.0 3.7 3.3 2.7 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1963 17.3 40.1 10.3 4.3 3.5 3.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1964 17.5 34.3 11.0 3.2 2.6 3.9 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1965 17.6 42.0 8.0 2.9 2.6 4.9 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1966 14.0 49.2 7.5 2.2 2.8 4.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1967 9.2 51.6 8.0 2.7 2.9 3.4 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. I 1968 11.9 45.5 8.2 4.4 2.7 2.2 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1-' 
1969 11.1 44.7 9.2 2.9 5.4 2.0 n.a. n.a. 0 n.a. n.a. I 
1970 14.5 42.0 9.0 3.1 5.3 .6 .8 .7 2.4 1.2 
1971 12.3 50.6 10.2 2,2 6.6 .3 1.8 .9 2.6 1.1 
1972 13.3 44.3 13.3 2.5 7.8 .3 1.2 1.0 1.8 1.1 
1973 18.5 36.3 15.1 2.6 8.4 .6 .9 - 2.8 1.1 
1974 15.2 27.6 14.1 4.5 10.9 1.1 1.4 1.6 3.6 1.5 
1975 19.2 20.8 13.1 3.7 6.2 1.5 3.5 2.3 5.5 1.9 
1976 25.1 26.7 10.2 3.4 6.4 1.1 3.1 .6 3.0 1.5 
1977 32.8 25.3 9.2 2.3 4.2 1.3 3.0 .7 2.5 1.8 
1978 34.7 23.4 7.0 1.8 6.4 2.6 2.6 .9 2.2 1.5 
1979 26.9 27.3 5.7 2.3 8.3 1.5 3.3 1.8 1.5 1.7 
1980 24.8 27.7 4.4 3.9 7.4 1.6 2.9 3.6 1.2 1.7 
1981 22.9 28.3 5.7 2.1 6.2 1.7 3.5 6.2 1.6 1.8 
1982 23.2 33.0 6.8 1.7 5.1 1,0 4.2 3.7 2.3 1.6 
Source: Central Bank of Honduras, Department of Economic Studies. 
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to the devastation of Hurricane Fifi in 1974 and the initial 
negative production impact associated with the transfer of 
some multinational banana plantations into domestic hands 
through agrarian reform measures in the mid-1970s. 
The coffee sector has also provided growing public sector 
savings through its contribution to government revenue. Honduras, 
along with most LDCs, finances most government expenditures 
through indirect taxes on imports, exports and domestic 
commerce. Table 7 illustrates how indirect taxes on imports 
and commercial activity have generated most of the revenue 
collected by the government. 
Export taxes (Column 4), on the other hand, played an 
unusually insignificant role as a source of government revenue 
up to 1976. This evidence allows one to conclude that the 
multinational banana plantations were very lightly taxed in 
comparison to other sources of revenue. Whereas bananas 
predominated as the major contributor of foreign exchange 
in Honduras up to the mid-1970s (Table 6), export taxes, 
other than coffee, (Column 4 minus Column 5 in Table 7), 
accounted for little more than one percent of total government 
revenue. Clearly Honduras was extracting very little surplus 
from the multinational export activity in bananas to reinvest 
in the rest of the economy. 
The growing role of coffee, however, changed this picture. 
From 1975 to the present, tax revenue from coffee activity 
grew markedly (Column 5, Table 7). Table 8 points out how 
coffee tax receipts grew as a percent of total government 
Table 7. Selected Tax Receipts and Central Government Revenue in 
Honduras, 1960-1982 (000,000 lempiras). 
Total Total 
Calendar Tax Gov. 
Year Income Property Import Expor~/ Coffee Commercial Other Receipts Rev.~/ 
(1) (2) (3) (4). (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
L.10.4 
9.5 
9.2 
11.3 
12.2 
16.7 
26.9 
34.0 
39.3 
43.2 
42.5 
41.9 
43.5 
46.1 
65.5 
74.5 
73.4 
90.8 
123.2 
148.6 
228.9 
177.4 
198.7 
L.0.8 
0.7 
0.7 
o.8 
1.1 
1.7 
1.4 
1.4 
1.6 
2.8 
3.0 
2.2 
3.2 
2.4 
2.2 
2.9 
2.8 
4.1 
4.6 
4.5 
7.2 
7.1 
7.4 
L.34.5 
35.1 
36.6 
35.7 
35.6 
40.9 
40.5 
41.2 
43.4 
39 .o 
44.7 
48.0 
51.9 
56.4 
64.9 
61.8 
80.4 
113.4 
129.6 
146.0 
148.7 
201.8 
178.2 
!/ Includes coffee tax receipts. 
L.3.4 
3.1 
3.7 
4.2 
4.3 
5.3 
5.1 
4.4 
6.5 
5.6 
5.6 
6.2 
6.1 
11.4 
14.8 
22.3 
49.1 
91.0 
95.1 
111.0 
129.5 
112.5 
93.3 
L.2.6 
2.2 
2.7 
3.4 
3.1 
4.2 
3.8 
3.7 
4.4 
4.0 
4.3 
4.3 
5.5 
6.7 
5.2 
8.3 
26.7 
55.4 
64.9 
60.5 
64.9 
39 .o 
41.6 
L.18.9 
18.9 
20.5 
2.0 
3.7 
3.0 
34.9 
3.0 
43.4 
49.0 
62.8 
61.5 
6.3 
76.4 
80.8 
85.6 
105.1 
125.8 
12.5 
163.3 
180.9 
194.2 
228.8 
L. .2 
.1 
.9 
.o 
.1 
.1 
.1 
.1 
.1 
.1 
.1 
.1 
.1 
.1 
.1 
.2 
.2 
.2 
.2 
.3 
.4 
.6 
.4 
L.68.4 
67.5 
70.7 
72.0 
83.9 
97.7 
108.9 
118.1 
134.3 
139.7 
158.7 
159.9 
172.1 
192.8 
228.3 
247.3 
311.0 
425.3 
482.2 
573.7 
695.6 
693.6 
715.4 
L.73.0 
74.1 
76.9 
78.9 
90.4 
108.8 
121.6 
129.4 
148.1 
153.6 
176.0 
180.1 
192.6 
218.4 
252.6 
283.3 
356.1 
468.0 
512.7 
633.3 
756.7 
738.6 
770.1 
2/ The difference between total tax receipts (column 8) and total government revenue 
- (column 9) refers to non-tax revenue, income transfers to the central government from 
other public sector entities and miscellaneous rents, fees, etc. 
Source: Monthly Bulletins of the Central Bank and Central Bank Yearbook; IHCAFE. 
I 
1-' 
N 
I 
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Table 8. Coffee Tax Receipts as a Share of Total 
Export Taxes and Total Central Government 
Revenue. 
Calendar 
Year 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
Coffee Tax Receipts 
as % of Total 
Export Taxes 
( 1) 
76.47 
70.97 
72.97 
80.95 
72.09 
79.25 
74.51 
84.09 
67.69 
71.4.3 
76.78 
69.35 
90.16 
58.77 
35.13 
37.22 
54.38 
60.88 
68.24 
54.50 
50.12 
34.67 
44.J:i8 
Coffee Tax Receipts 
as % of Total Central 
Govt. Revenue 
(2) 
3.6 
3.0 
3.5 
4.3 
3.4 
3.9 
3.1 
2.9 
3.0 
2.6 
2.4 
2.4 
2.9 
3.1 
2.1 
2.9 
7.5 
11.8 
12.7 
9.6 
8.6 
5.3 
5.4 
--------------·--------·----------------------
Source: Derived from data in Table 7. 
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revenue from the mid-1970s onwards. Combined evidence from 
Tables 6 and 8 highlight another interesting feature of 
coffee's relative contribution to export earnings and tax 
receipts. Although coffee export earnings were relatively 
minor up to the mid-1970s (Table 6) , nevertheless they accounted 
for an overwhelming share of the total export proceeds (Table 8, 
Column 1). Paradoxically, as coffee exports grew in the 
late 1970s, their share of total export tax receipts declined. 
These findings underscore how lightly bananas were taxed during 
their heyday in Honduran export activity (i.e. up to the 
mid-1970s); and, how important coffee tax receipts have been 
throughout as a source of government revenue. Secondly, it 
is clear that other export activities besides coffee are 
beginning to make a growing contribution to export tax receipts 
from the mid-1970s onwards, including bananas. In short, coffee 
earnings have been an important source of export earnings 
throughout this period increasing its relative role as a 
source of government revenue during the coffee boom due to 
the growth of exports, discussed earlier, and an increase in 
the export tax per quintal from 7.67 lempiras in 1974 to 
rates ranging between 3 and 7 times that level in the late 
1970s (Table 10, Column 3). 
This outflow of resources from the coffee sector to the 
rest of the economy has been accompanied by an equally impressive 
inflow of funds through the channeling of credit to coffee 
producers from both private and public sector banks, primarily 
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from Occidente, Sogerin and BANADESA. In addition, loans 
to coffee exporters and coffee cooperatives from these same 
sources have played an important role in allowing additional 
liquidity to filter down the hierarchy of marketing channels 
to producers. This will be discussed further, shortly. 
The real value of credit to producers measured either 
as a flow (i.e. new loans) or a stock (i.e. outstanding 
balances) had been increasing in size until 1977 (Table 9, 
Columns 1 and 2). Moreover, from 1976 to 1979 the flow of 
coffee finance represented unusually high percentages of 
the value of coffee output, reaching 91 percent in 1977 
(Table 9, Column 5). Coffee is the crop receiving the 
most generous financing through the agricultural portfolio 
in the banking system. From 1977 to the present, however, the 
annual flow of new loans to coffee producers has fallen. From 
1979 to the present it has fallen sharply in real terms 
(Column 2, Table 9). In 1976 new loans to finance coffee 
represented 91 percent of the annual value of coffee output in 
that year. By 1981 this share had fallen precipitously to 
only 20 percent. Clearly in the earlier period, given the 
fungibility of finance, a good part of the financing for coffee 
was very likely diverted off to other uses. In the later 
period the sharp contraction in liquidity represents a serious 
constraint on coffee activities. This reflects the growing 
shortage of liquidity in the economy as a whole in the early 
Table 9. Selected Measures of Coffee Loan Activity and Credit Output Ratios for the 
Coffee Sector in Honduras, 1960-1982 (in thousands of lempiras). 
Year 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
Credit Balances~ew Loans as 
Real Value of Real Value of as % Value of % of Value of 
outstanding Credit I News Loans for Real Value of Coffee Output Coffee Output 
Balances for Coffe~ Coffee Coffee Output (Col.1/Col.3) (Col.2/Col.3) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
L. 4,952 L. 5,065 L. 31,262 15.84% 16.20% 
5,456 4,766 26,779 20.37 17.80 
5,079 6,137 28,809 17.62 21.30 
5,807 6,887 33,420 17.38 20.61 
6,518 7,624 40,186 16.22 18.97 
7,801 8,703 47,914 16.28 18.16 
10,327 9,766 44,177 23.38 22.11 
11,780 10,289 37,131 31.73 27.71 
11,464 11,865 46,401 24.71 25.57 
12,?.08 22,404 36,209 33.72 61.87 
14,111 30,334 53,267 26.49 56.95 
16,837 29,499 44,480 30.91 54.50 
13,508 24,222 52,580 25.69 46.07 
11,420 27,212 72,673 15.71 37.44 
15,513 21,836 76,960 20.16 28.30 
15,445 221 394 63,474 24.33 35.28 
24,488 76,671 83,509 29.33 91.81 
32,106 113,997 148,721 21.59 76.65 
30,431 84,514 148,692 20.47 56.84 
36,397 67,568 120,125 30.29 56.25 
31,551 34,523 114,664 27.52 30.11 
22,931 18,197 90,969 25.21 20.00 
30,518 29,230 86,400 35.32 33.83 
!/The real values are nominal values deflated by the implicit GDP deflator (1966=100). 
2/ Real value of coffee output has been estimated by multiplying data on domestic 
- production (in Table 2) by the real farmgate price (column 5 of Table 10). 
source: central Bank of Honduras, Statistical Bulletin, various years for data on the 
nomina1 va1ue of coffee loans. 
I 
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1980s, and the poor world market conditions for coffee 
exports in the world recession at that time. 
This overview of the coffee sector reveals that 
coffee has been an important source of growth for the 
Honduran economy. Coffee exports contributed substantially 
to the foreign exchange earnings needed for continued growth 
of capital good and consumer good imports. Coffee tax 
receipts became an important source of government revenue 
in the mid-l970s through the growth of the tax base during 
the export boom and an increase in the tax levied on coffee 
exports. However by the early 1980s the strength of this 
fiscal support had weakened in the face of declining export 
growth. The promising growth impulse of the late 1970s 
with its accompanying upward shift in yields has now 
flattened out. It is useful now to investigate the market 
structure and pricing parameters affecting coffee producers 
during this more recent period and the policies that have 
been devised to deal with this slowdown in the growth of 
the sector. 
2. The Marketing Environment and Pricing 
and Marketing Margins 
The local marketing structure for coffee can best be 
described as a pyramid. As one approaches the final stages 
or upper tier of the marketing chain the number of interme-
diaries decline in number. At the first or bottom level of 
this network is the producer farmer. The actual number of 
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coffee farmers in Honduras is unclear. Estimates range from 
40,000 and upwards. The next layer consists of the first 
stage of wholesalers who purchase coffee from producers. 
This wholesaler can take on a variety of forms, an agent for 
an exporter, a coffee cooperative or a private wholesaler 
(i.e. "coyote" large or small) with no formal connections 
with exporters. Officials of IHCAFE estimate that approxi-
mately 80 percent of the coffee marketing activity is carried 
out through these private wholesalers or coyotes. They can 
then sell directly to an export firm (typically in San Ped'ro 
Sula) or, more likely, sell their coffee to other larger 
intermediaries or truckers who in turn will deal with the 
exporter. Coffee officials state that it is not unusual 
for much of the coffee harvest to pass through four to five 
intermediaries before it reaches the exporter. At each stage 
in the process the intermediaries decline in numbers and 
become larger in the volume of coffee they handle. 
The greater the number of layers of intermediaries the 
higher the real costs of marketing as markups accompany 
transactions at each stage. Within this process farmers will 
frequently consign their coffee to intermediaries and receive 
payment later after the coffee has been successfully sold for 
export. For those who have previously borrowed from the 
intermediary, repayment is deducted before payment. Abundant 
liquidity from the banking system for the financing of the 
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seasonal harvest through exporters can create conditions 
for prompt payment as the exporter can pay the intermediaries 
who in turn can either finance or immediately pay for the 
crop from producers. When there is a shortage of liquidity 
for working capital purposes, crops become consigned to 
truckers and shippers with actual payment delayed until export 
sales are consumated. 
Information on the pricing environment offers an insight 
into the marketing margin characteristic of the sector. This 
can be documented through price series on FOB export prices 
and farmgate prices. The farmgate price has been estimated 
by technicians in the Economic Studies Department of the 
Central Bank. The procedure followed estimates the marketing 
costs (i.e. transportation and losses in transit) in several 
regional settings in the country. These estimates are then 
subtracted from the regional wholesale coffee prices to arrive 
at the estimated farmgate price. The separate regional 
estimates are then weighted and averaged for a national 
aggregate farmgate price series. 
Table 10 sets forth the nominal FOB and farmgate prices 
as well as the export tax per quintal. The FOB and farmgate 
prices are then corrected for inflation (using the GDP 
deflator) and presented in a real price series in Columns 
4 and 5. As one would expect there was a substantial rise 
in real FOB and farmgate prices from the inception of the 
coffee boom in the mid-1970s. However it is also clear that 
Year 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
Table 10. Annual Average FOB Export Prices, Farmgate Prices and 
Export Tax per Quintal for Coffee, 1960-1982. 
FOB Export 
Price 
(per ruintal) 
1) 
L. 69.08 
65.10 
65.10 
63.24 
83.35 
81.99 
79.87 
76.17 
72.88 
68.87 
96.62 
83.94 
75.68 
108.85 
129.27 
106.03 
210.37 
424.50 
332.89 
270.38 
325.79 
230.56 
241.87 
Farmgate Export Rear :F6a-----~-~ear------
Price Tax Pric~/ Farmgate Price!/ 
leer quintal) (per quintal) (per quintal) (eer quintal) 
(2) (3) (4) (5) 
L. 55.00 
52.00 
52.00 
50.00 
65.00 
65.00 
6.300 
58.00 
57.00 
55.00 
75.72 
72.88 
69.95 
82.56 
100.16 
81.50 
118.61 
250.00 
203.20 
159.17 
172.79 
143.93 
147.98 
·----------
L. 7.67 
7.67 
7.67 
7.67 
7.67 
7.67 
7.67 
7.67 
7.67 
7.67 
7.67 
7.65 
7.67 
7.67 
7.67 
17.72 
27.98 
69.96 
51.23 
41.53 
51.78 
26.12 
32.83 
L. 80.72 
74.09 
71.57 
68.48 
85.65 
83.67 
79.87 
73.25 
69.25 
63.22 
86.64 
73.98 
63.92 
86.27 
91.74 
69.03 
125.95 
224.01 
164.24 
123.98 
135.21 
91.01 
88.25 
L. 64.51 
59.18 
57.17 
54.14 
66.80 
66.33 
63.00 
55.77 
54.16 
50.49 
67.90 
64.23 
59.08 
65.44 
71.08 
52.92 
71.62 
131.93 
100.25 
72.98 
71.71 
56.82 
54.00 
~/ Nom1nal FOB and farmgate prices deflated by the implicit GDP deflator (1966 = 100). 
Source: Central Bank of Honduras, Department of Economic Studies and IHCAFE. 
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the real FOB price series (Column 4) rose much more markedly 
and fell less quickly than the real farmgate price series 
(Column 5) after 1975. By 1981 both price series had returned 
to their pre-boom levels. 
Table 11 recasts this price data to reflect the changing 
margin between the FOB and farmgate prices directly. Column 1 
presents these findings for the period 1960-82. It highlights 
the fact that the farmgate price generally accounted for 75 
to 80 percent of the FOB price from 1960 to 1975. However 
this fairly constant share declined abruptly in 1976 and has 
remained much lower from 1976 to 1982 (55 to 60 percent) than 
in any of the previous periods leading up to 1976. Thus, 
after the readjustment from the sharp price rise in the mid-
1970s and then comparable price fall by the early 1980s, 
produqers prices (as a percent of FOB prices) had been scaled 
back some twenty percentage points below their historical 
levels of the pre-1976 period. 
One possible explanation for this growing wedge between 
the farmgate price and the FOB price centers on the growing 
role of government export taxes. As seen in Table 10, export 
taxes per quintal for coffee did rise from 1976 onwards 
as the government understandably attempted to capture some of 
the windfall gains accruing to the coffee sector from the 
coffee bonanza. However, as Column 2 of Table 11 illustrates, 
the export tax as a percent of the FOB price averaged 10.6 
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Table 11. Selected Indicators Reflecting the Impact of 
Prices, Taxes and Implicit Marketing Margin 
for Coffee Farmers in Honduras, 1960-82 
-----· -----------------------·-Implicit E'lf"ecti ve __ _ 
Year 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
Coffee Farmgate 
Price as % of 
FOB Price 
( l) 
79.6% 
79.9 
79.9 
79.1 
78.0 
79.2 
78.8 
76.1 
78.2 
79.7 
78.4 
86.8 
92.4 
75.8 
77.5 
76.9 
56.4 
58.9 
61.0 
58.7 
53.0 
62.4 
61.2 
Coffee Export 
Tax as a % 
of FOB Price 
(2) 
11.1% 
11.8 
11.8 
12.1 
9.2 
9.4 
9.6 
10.0 
10.5 
11.1 
7.9 
9.1 
10.1 
7.1 
5.9 
7.3 
13.3 
16.4 
15.3 
15.4 
15.9 
11.3 
13.6 
----------------· 
Marketing 
Margin as 
a % of 
FOB Price_!/ 
( 3) 
9. 3% 
8.3 
8.3 
8.8 
12.8 
11.4 
11.6 
13.9 
11.3 
9.2 
13.7 
4.1 
-2.5 
17.1 
16.6 
15.8 
30.3 
24.7 
23.7 
25.9 
31.1 
26.3 
25.3 
Exchange 
Rat~/ 
(lempiras 
per dollar) (4} -
L. 2.33 
2.28 
2.20 
2.17 
2.06 
2.04 
2.00 
1.93 
1.90 
1.83 
1. 79 
1. 76 
1.68 
1.58 
1.41 
1.29 
1.19 
1.05 
0.98 
0.91 
0.83 
0.78 
0.72 
---------------
~/ Implicit marketing margin is defined as the residual rema1n1ng 
after subtracting the farmgate price and taxes from the FOB 
price (100 minus columns 1 and 2). 
~/ Effective exchange rate is the nominal average annual exchange 
rate divided by the implicit GDP deflator (1966 = 100). 
Source: Derived from basic price data reported in Table 10. 
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percent in the 1960s, 11.4 percent in the 1970s and only 
14.5 percent from 1976 to 1982, the period in which the farm-
gate price share fell so sharply. Indeed, after accounting 
for the farmgate price and the tax share, the resulting 
marketing margin (Column 3) averaged roughly 10 percent 
in the 1960s, 20 percent in the 1970s and about 27 percent 
in the period 1976-82. Clearly this marketing margin has been 
widening much more rapidly than the minor increase in the 
tax share alone. 
Assuming that the estimation procedure for the farmgate 
price described above is carried out correctly and accurately, 
there are two possible explanations for this widening 
marketing margin. First, one could argue that there has 
been a growing concentration of market power among the 
marketing agents of the coffee sector leading to a decline 
in competitive pricing and an increase in the marketing margins 
for the intermediaries, reflecting this growing market power. 
This oligopsony reasoning could explain why farmer-producers 
are receiving lower and lower shares of the FOB price. Unless 
or until separate marketing studies are undertaken to determine 
the validity of this growing "market power" argument, it is 
difficult to test this hypothesis directly without pricing 
and marketing information for the leading export firms and 
key intermediaries. The most one can do is infer the probable 
existence of some degree of market power within the intermediary 
hierarchy from the evidence on gross margins in Table 11. 
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However, one cannot determine whether there has been a growing 
concentration of marketing shares among the leading inter-
mediaries or whether the "net" marketing margins have increased. 
Casual empiricism would suggest that there is a relatively 
small number of export firms and key shippers that predominate 
in the upper t~er of market intermediaries, between 10 to 12 
in number. It would not be surprising that they would be in 
a position to exercise some market power in their price 
negotiations with intermediaries with whom they deal under-
neath them. These intermediaries, in turn, would pass on 
these negotiated prices (including their own margins) to 
smaller intermediaries and producers. The issue at hand here 
is what caused this marketing wedge to widen from the mid-
1970s onwards. 
The second argument would explain the widening marketing 
margin not so much in terms of increasing oligopsonistic 
market power, but more in terms of existing market power being 
sufficient to allow key export and marketing firms to filter 
out some of the rapid price increases in the post-1975 period, 
thereby increasing their profit margins from the boom in world 
markets. At the same time farmers were also benefiting from 
a rise in this same period. What we are talking about here is 
the relative distribution of the windfall profits derived 
from the coffee boom and it is not surprising that while both 
parties gained, the top layer of intermediaries no doubt 
gained more than the producers. 
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The next issue at hand is an explanation for the asymetric 
adJustment in the marketing margin that left coffee producers 
relatively worse off in 1981 and 1982 than they had been in 
the early 1970s. Thus in the adjustment on the downward side 
of the price cycle producers were unable to reestablish their 
former relative share of the now lower FOB price. A probable 
explanation here lies in the rising real costs of marketing 
over the past eight years. The real costs of fuel rose sharply 
after 1974-5 and imports of transportation vehicles and spare 
parts became more difficult and costly by the late 1970s. 
The most likely scenario is that the leading marketing agents 
in the coffee sector were successful in cushioning their 
margins during this period of a downward adjustment by passing 
on the incidence of their rising costs to farmers in the form 
of lower farmgate prices for coffee as reflected in Column 1 
of Table 11. 
This second argument does not deny the existence of some 
degree of existing market power and that some form of admini-
stered pricing naturally results from this market power. 
However, the argument emphasizes that the probable cause of 
the initial increase in the gross marketing margin lies the 
existing market power being sufficient to allocate a growing 
share of coffee boom profits to non-producers while in the 
downswing this market power allowed market agents to pass 
on some or all of the growing real costs of marketing to 
producers in the form of lower farmgate prices. From the 
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producers perspective it makes little difference which 
explanation prevails. In the end the net result for farmers 
is a lower farmgate price (as a percent of FOB prices) than 
that which would have ruled in a more competitive pricing 
environment. In a more competitive marketing setting the 
increased costs of marketing would have reduced the net profit 
margins of intermediaries with less of this rise in costs 
passed on down to producers in the form of lower offer 
prices. 
Another important element negatively affecting producer 
incentives is the growing overvaluation of the exchange rate. 
The real exchange rate (the nominal rate divided by the 
implicit GDP deflator) is presented in Table 11, Column 4 
for this period. Alternative purchasing power parity formulae 
could be drawn upon to estimate other patterns of overvaluation. 
Regardless of the method chosen, it is difficult not to con-
clude that a growing overvaluation of the lempira has occurred, 
particularly, in the last eight years. This, of course, 
becomes an implicit tax on coffee producers and exporters alike. 
Finally the government tax on coffee constitutes an 
additional policy parameter affecting producer incentives. 
However, in this case the burden of real taxes, deflated for 
inflation have not been particularly high although they have 
increased some in the more recent time period. This was to 
be expected in the face of a coffee boom with the desire to 
capture some of the rise in profits for reinvestment in other 
government programs. 
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In conclusion the pricing patterns and marketing margins 
that have emerged from the local market structure for marketing 
coffee have penalized coffee producers in relative terms. 
During the upswing of the price cycle in the coffee boom both 
producers and intermediaries gained through the rise in real 
prices though the latter experienced a greater relative gain. 
In the downswing producers have found themselves worse off 
than their position on the eve of the coffee boom, both in 
terms of real farmgate price and in terms of their relative 
share of FOB price. 
3. Recent Policy Initiatives and Institutional Change 
The most important governmental institution in the coffee 
sector is the Institute Hondureno de Cafe (IHCAFE). This 
institution was founded in 1971 to provide marketing, credit 
and technical assistance to coffee farmers. IHCAFE also 
provides for the marketing of coffee for domestic consumers 
and handles the negotiations for Honduras' quota in the 
International Coffee Organization (ICO) . The funding for these 
services comes from two sources. One source is the registration 
of coffee for export. IHCAFE currently receives 5.20 lempiras 
for each quintal of coffee registered for export. The second 
source of funds comes from the sale of coffee to the domestic 
market. All coffee that is marketed is delivered to an exporter. 
To insure that a sufficient amount of coffee is available to 
the local market, IHCAFE requires that 8 percent of all coffee 
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delivered to exporters be surrendered to them, i.e., out of 
100 quintals, 8 quintals would be sent to domestic roasters 
and 92 quintals would be exported. These 8 quintals would be 
purchased at a price of 90 lps. (currently) and sold to 
domestic roasters at a price of 102 lps. This interchange 
of coffee from exporters to domestic roasters is handled by 
the "Fondo de Intercarnbio de Calidades" (FIC). The FIC is 
so named since the 8 percent that is sold to the domestic 
market can be of poorer quality than that which is exported. 
The producer determines which 8 bags per 100 will be inter-
changed. At present these domestic transactions place an 
implicit tax on coffee consumers because roasters can purchase 
coffee at 60 lps. per quintal. Even though these transactions 
are technically illegal, the mechanism to enforce this policy 
does not exist. 
IHCAFE also plays an important role in promoting the 
exports of coffee. Important here is the issue of quotas. 
Before the creation of the International Coffee Organization 
(ICO), Honduras sold all of its coffee to what later became 
mewhqr countries of the ICO. In 1980, when the reo was reac-
tivated, quotas were set for producing countries in order to 
keep world coffee prices high. Honduras was still able to 
sell all of its coffee to member countries for the first two 
years of the reo era. However, during the latest round of 
negotiations, Honduras' quota was cut from 1,252,000 bags 
to 1,007,000 bags (one bag= 46 kilos). This meant that 
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Honduras could not export all of its coffee at higher prices 
to reo member countries. There are several conflicting reports 
as to why Honduras' quota was cut. One explanation is that 
falling world prices necessitated that quotas be decreased 
to help raise world prices. Another belief is that the new 
negotiating team was inexperienced and did not get the best 
deal for Honduras (the new chief of the negotiating team did 
not bother to go to London). The result has been that Honduras 
has had to sell more of its coffee to non-member countries 
at lower prices. 
Currently, 53 percent of the coffee exported goes to 
member countries, 39 percent to non-member countries and 8 
percent to the domestic market. Further, no exporter can gain 
an advantage over another because IHCAFE dictates that of every 
100 quintals registered for export, 53 are allowed to be 
exported to member countries, 39 must be exported to non-
member countries, and 8 go for the domestic market. The 
ramifications of this action are severe. First, exporters 
and ultimately farmers are subsidizing IHCAFE in the hopes 
of gaining better marketing services (i.e. prices and quotas), 
however, the opposite result occurs. With a smaller quota 
not only are FOB prices reduced, but farm prices and incomes 
decline as well. Second, the government receives no tax 
receipts from the exports of coffee to non-member countries. 
Third, foreign exchange earnings are reduced since lower FOB 
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prices and quotas means less foreign exchange earnings. Thus, 
an institution that was primarily set up to enhance the sector's 
export performance has in recent years probably exaccerbated 
its decline through ineffective quota negotiations. 
IHCAFE was also designed to help improve yields and 
productivity within the coffee sector. Evidence suggests 
IHCAFE has apparently made a contribution here. We have 
seen that yields have been increasing substantially in the 
1970s. Coffee yields in other Central American countries 
are generally higher than in Honduras (Table 12). In 
El Salvador and Costa Rica, for example, yields are twice 
the level of Honduras. However Table 12 makes it clear that 
Honduras has experienced the most rapid increase in yields 
among all the countries in Central America. Prior to the 
creation of IHCAFE in 1971 agronomical and related research 
activities were minimal as bananas dominated the export picture. 
The decade of the 1970s saw increased emphasis on the classic 
small farmer crop in Honduras, coffee. The introduction of 
new varieties and development of a national extension network 
was undertaken with generally promising results despite the 
obvious difficulties of servicing a widespread small farmer 
clientele. However the recent falling off of yield increases 
implies that new challenges face the IHCAFE staff to stem 
the growth of coffee rust and expand the reach of new inputs 
and varieties to more farmers. However recent budget cuts 
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Table 12. Average Coffee Yields!/ for Central 
American Countries, 1969-1980 
-------------------------------------------%-change-
countries 1969-71 1978-80 in Yields 
Costa Rica 870 1,242 4. 7. 
El Salvador 1,122 1,022 -8.9 
Honduras 392 572 45.9 
Nicaragua 454 598 31.7 
Guatemala 544 630 15.8 
----- --------------------
!/ Yields are defined as kilograms per hectare. 
Source: FAO Production Yearbook, Vol. 34, 1980, 
Various Tables. 
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in IHCAFE have reduced the number of extension agents available 
to service the coffee sector and the retooling of the remaining 
extension agents into part time credit officials may have 
affected their performance in their regular extension duties. 
This is being done to facilitate the implementation of a new 
credit program under the auspicies of IHCAFE and USAID. 
This new credit program is designed to raise coffee 
yields. The problem of low yields is viewed as a direct impact 
of the coffee rust that has recently spread through Honduras. 
The IHCAFE-USAID sponsored program is designed to help farmers 
rehabilitate their coffee farms. The program is presently 
designed to reach 3,000 small farmers, roughly 5 to 10 percent 
of all coffee farmers. Participants are chosen by the exten-
sion staff in conjunction with the "headman" in each town or 
area serviced. The loans are issued by BANADESA, BANHCAFE 
and Banco Occidente at an interest rate of 17 percent (in 1983). 
Only time will tell whether there is a tradeoff in using 
extension agents as loan officials. Given the heavy amount 
of paperwork involved and the supervisory aspect the agents 
are expected to pay in monitoring and recovering loans, the 
technical extension aspect may not receive as much attention 
as it otherwise would. Farmers not in the program will also 
suffer as the current body of extension agents will become 
primarily concerned with their credit clients. Credit 
programs in other countries dealing with similar monocrop 
programs have met with unpromising results,--with little 
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Table 13. Change in the Components of the Interest 
Rate Charged in the IHCAFE/USAID Coffee 
Rehabilitation Program in Honduras, 1983. 
------Interest Rate 
components Old Program 
( 1} 
New Program 
{2) 
Participating Bank 3.0% 6.0% 
Reserve 6.5 4.5 
A val 2.0 0.0 
Central Bank 0.5 0.5 
USAID 2.0 2.0 
IHCAFE 3.0 4.0 
Total Interest Rate 
to Borrower 17.0% 17.0% 
-------------------------------------
Source: USAID, Tegucigalpa 
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increase in output and poor loan repayment. Moreover, 
given that the real rate of return to coffee production 
has been declining in recent years, there may be little 
incentive by farmers to undertaken rehabilitation even if 
credit can be obtained. Thus, the possibility exists that 
current credits may be used in other crop enterprises or 
for consumption. 
Another feature of this program is the role of private 
banks and public banks in the credit program. Table 11 
contains data on the breakdown of the interest rate returns 
to various sponsors of the program both before and after the 
recent inclusion of Banco Occidente, a private bank, into 
the program. Before the inclusion of Banco Occidente, 
the banks (mainly BANADESA) received a lower share of the 
interest rate, but allegedly benefited from an aval for bad 
debts held by IHCAFE. These avals are essentially worthless 
as BANADESA has discovered. Banco Occidente, being more 
profit oriented, successfully argued to have the avals 
drawn into each participating bank's share and further 
negotiated the right for participating banks to 
control their own reserves for bad debts and, in 
the meantime, be free to lend out these reserves at the going 
ceiling rate of 19 percent. BANADES~, being a public insti-
tution, had been less sensitive to these issues perhaps feeling 
they could draw funds from public sources whenever they had to 
make up for poor loan recoveries. Banco Occidente also insisted 
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that the nurserles with the new plants be located close to 
the coffee farms serviced to reduce the transactions costs 
for farmers to purchase and transplant young seedlings. In 
the end the participation of a key private bank in the program 
did much to restructure the operating procedures in a more 
viable direction. 
In short the problem of low yields is being dealt with 
for the most part by increasing credit to farmers. The problem 
of high marketing margins and low farmgate prices is also 
being handled through increased credit, largely to exporters. 
These actions grow out of a perception of the marketing 
problem being viewed as a lack of liquidity in the sector. 
Increased liquidity will presumably allow exporters and 
wholesalers to pay cash and possibly a higher price to farmers. 
This credit expansion is being undertaken in part by a bank 
set up to deal solely with the coffee sector--BANHCAFE. 
BANHCAFE is directly financed by a 1.66 Ips. "tax" on each 
quintal delivered for export. Loans are then made to the 
coffee sector (largely to export firms and marketers) from 
these funds. These loans are considered to be less risky 
than producer loans and the resultant liquidity is more easily 
injected and widely disseminated throughout the sector to 
producers by this trickle-down method. This is efficient 
and equitable only if more money is put back than is taken 
out. This implies that loans should generate positive rates 
of return over time (i.e. high loan recoveries with realistic 
interest rates) otherwise the bank will be decapitalized 
-36-
through delinquency and default. BANHCAFE apparently realizes 
this as they have begun to diversify their portfolio into 
non-coffee loans. Currently, 80 percent of the portfolio 
is tied up in the coffee sector. However, informal conversations 
with BANHCAFE officials implied that non-coffee loans (i.e. 
20 percent of their portfolio) account for 90 percent of their 
profits. This implies that non-coffee enterprises are far 
more profitable than coffee. No private bank based on 
deposit mobilization would ever concentrate its portfolio 
so heavily into such a current low rate of return area as 
coffee. BANHCAFE however has a certain obligation to service 
coffee loan demand since the coffee tax is its main source 
of funds. BANHCAFE's efforts no doubt relax the liquidity 
constraint for the sector, but it is at best a holding 
action until the low rate of return that exists in coffee 
production is improved through a recovery of world coffee 
markets and an improvement in yields. 
4. Conclusions 
The main conclusions of this study highlight the generally 
positive performance of the coffee sector in Honduras in 
providing a growing amount of foreign exchange, government 
revenue and capital for the rest of the economy to draw upon 
in its current path of economic growth. The sector grew 
appreciably during the 1960s however it was the decade of 
the 1970s that saw a marked gorwth of output, exports and 
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improved yields for the sector. Th~s growth eclipsed that 
of other export activities with the coffee boom of the mid 
to late 1970s propelling the essentially small farmer coffee 
sector ahead of the plantation oriented banana sector as the 
principal foreign exchange earner in the economy. 
Nevertheless by the late 1970s and early l980s 1 the 
rapid growth of output 1 exports and yields flattened out in 
the face of a weakening world market for coffee. This decline 
in real prices was also associated with a marked increase 
in the marketing margin between the farmgate price and the FOB 
price thereby worsening the relative position of producer 
farmgate prices as a percent of FOB prices. This strongly 
suggests a relatively inefficient internal marketing structure 
that prevents rapid price rises from being passed on to 
producers as quickly as to other elements in the marketing 
chain and allows 1 in the downward price cycle, a more rapid 
decline in farmgate prices than FOB prices. 
In the last five years coffee farmers have been implicitly 
and explicitly penalized due to a deterioration of the world 
coffee market, a still inefficient domestic marketing structure 
that apparently places high adjustment costs on producers~ a 
growing overvaluation of the exchange rate and government taxes 
on exports. This accounts for the current levelling of 
previously promising output and yield performances in the 1970s. 
Reinforcing the recent decline has been the performance 
of IHCAFE. This institution was designed to enhance the coffee 
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sector's performance, but has contributed to its stagnation 
through less effective quota negotiations in the ICO. This poor 
international marketing performance stands out in contrast to 
its apparently effective technical assistance, given the 
rapid growth in yields throughout the 1970s. In the most 
recent years IHCAFE, along with other policymakers, believe 
that only through an expanded supervised credit program can 
the sector become more viable. This also explains why a 
portion of the currently reduced extension staff is being 
retrained to become part time credit agents. This credit program will 
only reach a select subset of farmers in Honduras in an attempt 
to improve the still low rate of return to coffee. The main 
policy response to the marketing system has been to increase 
credit to exporters and have it trickle down to the farmers 
through the intermediary network. Attempts to increase credit 
is consistent with a recent Ohio State University report that 
suggests there is a credit shortage in the entire agricultural 
sector. However, increasing credit to the coffee sector is 
not the primary solution for the low rate of return that 
exists for producers in this sector. More agronomical 
research and a better staffed and larger extension service is 
needed for this effort. 
How should the rate of return to coffee be increased? 
Three ways come to mind. First, effective technological 
change is needed to raise farm productivity so that at 
existing prices farmers can be competitive and earn profits. 
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However, this leaves in place the inefficient marketing 
structure. Another approach might emphasize an increased 
role for the government to establish a government marketing 
board to compete with private buyers. IHCAFE (or some 
equivalent entity) would then become an important buyer and 
exporter of coffee in Honduras, with the intention of insuring 
that farmers receive a higher price than is currently paid. 
This approach has been tried in many other lesser developed 
countries with generally disasterous results. Farmers are 
usually worse off under these government dominated marketing 
schemes. A better approach would emphasize ways to make the 
existing private marketing channels more efficient and 
competitive so that a greater proportion of the FOB price 
gets transformed to the farmgate price. A third approach 
would increase the value of nonfood agricultural exports by 
raising the opportunity cost of resources used in coffee 
exports. A way to accomplish this would be by increasing 
the value of these same labor and material resources used in 
domestic foodstuffs (i.e. promoting increases in productivity 
in basic grains). Thus, resources used in coffee production 
would have to be more productive in order for farmers to meet 
their higher alternative resource cost-use. This has benefits 
for the rest of Honduras, as increased productivity of resource 
use will mean less resources need to be tied up in coffee 
production and can be transferred to other sectors in the 
economy. However, this may be met with resistance by Honduran 
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policymakers who are putting more resources into the coffee 
sector and have yet to believe that a large amount of resources 
(i.e. labor) can be transferred out of coffee. However, this 
natural release of resources is a more efficient and equitable 
transfer than the current methods of resource extraction--
built on inefficient marketing, an overvalued exchange rate 
and government taxation. The coffee sector has the ability 
to contribute to continued growth of Honduras. However, the 
sector cannot meet these contributions when the methods of 
resource transfer impact negatively on producer incentives 
and technological change. 
5. Future Research 
There are three areas identified for future research. 
The first item is to better understand the current marketing 
arrangements that exist for coffee within Honduras. The 
various credit and price relationships that are present 
at different stages of the marketing chain need to be explored 
further so that the existing data base can be improved and 
more satisfactory insights gained into the market imperfection 
within the marketing area. The analysis would highlight 
whicb improvements could be undertaken at the proper place in 
the chain. The second step would be to identify and evaluate 
the potential for more profitable uses of resources currently 
employed in the coffee sector by coffee farmers. This would 
enable Honduran policymakers to locate and support those 
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entcrprises that have a higher rate of return than coffee 
and hence earn or save more foreign exchange than coffee. 
Further, those enterprises that are more labor intensive 
could also be identified so that unemployment is not a 
factor in the natural movement of resources. A third 
thrust could investigate the bottlenecks to technological 
change in the sector and why yields are still not on par 
with other Central American countries. Technological 
breakthroughs could be an important means to release resources 
to other sectors as well as improve productivity and welfare 
for coffee producers. 
II. BASIC GRAINS 
1. Introduction 
We next turn our attention to the basic grains sector, 
corn, beans, rice and sorghum. This sector has grown in 
importance in domestic policymaking for agriculture in the 
past decade. It is the preeminent small farmer crop area 
in the Honduran economy. As such it has received much 
attention in the agrarian reform initiatives and represents 
the principal crop activity on many of the recently created 
reform group entities in the countryside. A national network 
of extension agents has been established in the Ministry of 
Natural Resources (RRNN) to service basic grains farmers and, 
BANADESA, the public sector agricultural development bank 
issues substantial short term seasonal credit each year to 
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service a growing clientele of basic grains farmers. IHMA, 
the Honduran Marketing Institute, plays an important role 
in setting guaranteed pre-harvest support prices for these 
crops and engages in buying, selling, importing and exporting 
basic grains products. Its domestic market activity may 
account for anywhere from 10 to 15 percent of the total marketing 
of basic grains in any given year. However, it holds an 
exclusive monopoly on the import and export of basic grains 
as part of its price stabilization role for the sector. 
Finally all these public entities, RRNN, BANADESA, 
IHMA along with CONSUPLANE and other government officials 
from the Central Bank and the Ministries of Finance and 
Economy play a role in drawing up, coordinating and imple-
menting a national basic grains program each year. Essentially 
this becomes an exercise to establish credit targets for 
BANADESA and the rediscount window of the Central Bank to 
service producers in the basic grains sector and marketing 
and pricing goals for IHMA. 
Basic grains activity fulfills two of the four basic 
functions of the agricultural sector described in the initial 
pages of this report: providing foodstuffs for the domestic 
economy and the saving of foreign exchange through decreasing 
the country's reliance on food imports. We shall explore 
how well the sector has performed in meeting these goals, 
review the policies that have helped or hindered this performance 
and discuss what could be done to improve the sector's 
performance. 
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2. The Growth and Productivity Record for Basic Grains 
Tables 14 through 22 set forth all the relevant data 
documenting the historical growth in output, yields and area 
for the four crops comprising the basic grains sector: corn, 
beans, rice and sorghum. Tables 15, 17, 19 and 21 contain 
the absolute data on output, area and yields while Tables 
16, 18, 20 and 22 transform these data into indices that 
permit one to compare the differential growth of these 
variables over time. For the purposes of synthesis Table 14 
presents all the relevant findings for all four crops for 
selected time periods in the past two decades. 
Column 1 of Table 14 underscores the fact that for the 
past two decades Honduras has not experienced a "green 
revolution" in the production of basic foodstuffs. Rice 
and corn have recorded higher rates of growth than beans and 
sorghum. However these rates, along with the aggregate 
growth for all four crops tabulated on Line 13 (2.74 percent) 
is substantially below levels that could be associated with 
any breakthrough with green revolution technology. Except 
for rice they do not measure up to the probable aggregate 
demand for food based on the rate of growth of population 
(3.5 percent) and an increment for the income elasticity of 
demand for foodstuffs times the growth of per capita income 
over this period (between 1.0 to 2.0 percent per year). 
If one looks at the time profile of output performance, 
total basic grains production increased about 2.97 percent 
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Table 14. Average Annual Rates of Growth of Physical 
Output, Area and Yields for Basic Grains 
for Selected Periods in Honduras, 1960-82. 
-------------------':rime-P'erTods (All based oncrop Years) 
Crop Variables l960-82 1960-70 1970-82 1970~6 1976-82 
---- ( 1 ) - ( 2 ) ( 3) - ( 4 ) ( 5 ) 
1. Corn production 3.55 4.17 3.12 1.00 4.95 
2. Corn area 1.25 1. 77 0.90 2.84 -0.77 
3. Corn yields 2.21 2.27 2.17 -1.59 5.40 
4. Bean production 1.83 3.17 0.90 -5.40 6.29 
5. Bean area 1.25 1.05 1. 39 -5.49 7.28 
6. Bean yields 0.63 1.92 -0.27 0.69 -1.10 
7. Rice production 4.65 1. 37 6.95 18.21 -2.69 
8. Rice area 3.37 1. 75 4.51 12.49 -2.34 
9. Rice yields 0.83 -·0. 54 l. 78 4.64 -0.66 
10. Sorghum production.!.1 1.58 - 0. l 7 3.04 0.01 6.07 
11. Sorghum area 1.71 1.12 2.20 10.52 -6.12 
12. Sorghum yields 4.51 4.74 4.31 -4.84 13.46 
13. Total bas~c Zlains 
productto~ 2.74 2.97 2.58 1.89 3.19 
--- ------- ·-----
!/The sum of the average growth rates of area and yields does 
not coincide with the average growth rate of production due 
to the existence of outliers in these growth rates series. 
~The estimate of aggregate basic grains output is based on a 
Laspeyres Index using 1970 prices as weights. 
Source: Derived from basic data reported in Tables 15, 17, 19 
and 21. 
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Table 15. Production, Area and Yields of Corn 
in Honduras, 1960-1982 
------- -----Prociuc-tron:---- -------A.rea-- ------ --ffefci--
CroE_Y~~-lquintals)~/ (in Manzanas)~/ (QQ/Mz} 
1960/61 
1961/62 
1962/63 
1963/64 
1964/65 
1965/66 
1966/67 
1967/68 
1968/69 
1969/70 
1970/71 
1972/73 
1973/74 
1974/75 
1975/76 
1976/77 
1977/78 
1978/79 
1979/80 
1980/81 
1982/83 
< 1) ----f2J- -- --m---
5,360,445 
5,696,820 
6,181,770 
6,266,306 
7,366,245 
6,210,972 
7,379,724 
7,401,184 
7,422,707 
7,444,292 
7,487,651 
7,509,425 
7,533,469 
7,575,434 
7,896,752 
8,567,872 
9,238,992 
11,423,599 
7,181,503 
10,596,424 
9,408,171 
349,670 
361,475 
382,062 
377,260 
4301530 
399,677 
401,154 
402,180 
403,206 
404,232 
406,284 
407,310 
411,663 
410,620 
474,085 
546,049 
617,799 
599,892 
476,000 
484,266 
426,669 
15.33 
15.76 
16.18 
16.62 
17.04 
15.54 
18.40 
18.40 
18.41 
18.42 
18.43 
18.44 
18.35 
18.45 
16.66 
15.95 
14.95 
19.04 
15.09 
21,88 
22.05 
!/ One quintal (QQ) equals 100 lbs. 
11 One manzana (Mz) equals .7 hectares or 1.8 acres. 
Source: Ministry of Natural Resources Yearbook, 1983 
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Table 16. Indices of Production, Area and 
Yields for Corn in Honduras, 
1960-1982 (1960/61 = 100) 
Crop Year Production Area Yield 
( 1) ( 2) ( 3) 
1960/61 100.00 100.00 100.00 
1961/62 106.28 103.38 102.80 
1962/63 115.32 109.26 105.55 
1963/64 116.90 107.89 108.35 
1964/65 136.86 123.13 111.16 
1965/66 115 .87 114.30 101.37 
1966/67 137.67 114.72 120.00 
1967/68 138.07 115.02 120.04 
1968/69 138.47 115.31 120.09 
1969/70 138.88 115.60 120.13 
1970/71 138.28 115.90 120.17 
1971/72 139.68 116.19 120.22 
1972/73 140.09 116.48 120.27 
1973/74 140.91 117.73 119.69 
1974/75 141.32 117.43 120.34 
1975/76 147.32 135.58 108.66 
1976/77 159.84 156.16 102.35 
1977/78 172.36 176.68 97.55 
1978/79 213.11 171.56 124.22 
1979/80 133.97 136.13 98.42 
1980/81 159.33 138.74 114.84 
1981/82 197.68 138.49 142.74 
1981/83 175.51 122.02 143.84 
------
Source: Table 15. 
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Table 17. Production, Area and Yields for Beans 
in Honduras, 1960-1982 
-Production Area -Yields 
Cro;e Year (in Quintals)l/ (in Manzanas)2/ LqT/mz) ( 1) (2) 3) 
1960/61 869,185 99,993 9.15 
1961/62 936,580 99,425 9.42 
1962/63 988,746 102,143 9.68 
1963/64 1,098,746 110,420 9.95 
1964/65 1,274,579 134,714 10.22 
1965/66 860,769 94,019 9.16 
1966/67 1,170,459 100,093 11.69 
1967/68 1,113,223 105,260 10.58 
1968/69 1,055,987 104,422 10.11 
1969/70 998,751 103,584 9.64 
1970/71 941,515 102,746 9.16 
1971/72 884,279 101,908 8.68 
1972/73 827,043 101,070 8.18 
1973/74 752,961 89,034 8.46 
1974/75 734,238 88,949 8.25 
1975/76 714,562 105,458 6.78 
1976/77 682,887 107,732 6.34 
1977/78 651,112 110,006 5.92 
1978/79 964,451 116,613 8.27 
1979/80 760,562 103,745 7.33 
1980/81 790,739 97,619 8.10 
1981/82 929,621 109,244 8.51 
1982/83 972,417 95,134 10.22 
!/ One quintal (QQ) equals 100 lbs. 
~/ one Manzana (Mz) equals .7 hectares or 1.8 acres. 
Source: Same as Table 15. 
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Table 18. Indices of Production, Area and 
Yields for Beans in Honduras, 
1960-1982 (1960/61 = 100) 
Crop Year Production Area Yields 
( 1) (2) {3) 
1960/61 100.00 100.00 100.00 
1961/62 107.75 104.67 102.95 
1962/63 113.76 107.53 105.79 
1963/64 126.40 116.24 108.74 
1964/65 146.64 141.82 103.40 
1965/66 99.03 98.97 100.06 
1966/67 134.66 105.37 127.79 
1967/68 128.08 110.81 115.58 
1968/69 121.49 109.93 110.52 
1969/70 114.91 109.04 105.38 
1970/71 108.32 108.16 100.15 
1971/72 101.74 107.28 94.83 
1972/73 95.15 106.40 89.43 
1973/74 86.63 93.73 92.43 
1974/75 84.46 93.64 90.21 
1975/76 82.21 111.02 74.05 
1976/77 78.57 113.41 69.28 
1977/78 74.91 115.80 64.69 
1978/79 110.96 122.76 90.39 
1979/80 87.50 109.21 80.12 
1980/81 90.97 102.76 88.53 
1981/82 106.95 115.00 93.00 
1982/83 111.88 100.15 111.71 
Source: Table 17. 
-49-
Table 19. Production, Area and Yields for 
Rice in Honduras, 1960-1982. 
----------ProdUCtion -----Area ------Yield-
Crop Ye~r (Quintales)l/ (Manzana)~/ (QQ/Mz) 
---m -- (2) ( 3) · 
1960/61 279,870 13,520 20.70 
1961/62 262,960 13,024 20.19 
1962/63 271,960 13,819 19.68 
1963/64 233,430 12,177 19.17 
1964/65 2171365 11,649 18.66 
1965/66 203,050 11,685 18.15 
1966/67 246,853 13,311 18.55 
1967/68 263,897 13,929 18.95 
1968/69 282,167 14,617 19.30 
1969/70 301,596 15,339 19.66 
1970/71 322,419 16,696 20.03 
1971/72 344,680 16,981 26.41 
1972/7 3 368,478 17,725 20.79 
197 3/74 439,076 19,434 22.59 
1974/75 469,392 201393 23.02 
1975/76 762,567 29,678 25.69 
1976/77 606,787 25,814 23.51 
1977/78 564,356 24,356 23.17 
1978/79 694,218 24,271 28.60 
1979/80 697,983 27,421 25.45 
1980/81 790,647 28,111 28.13 
1981/82 807,816 30,303 26.66 
1982/83 561,707 24,054 23.55 
-------- ---------
------
!.I One quintal (QQ) equals 100 lbs. 
~./ One manzana (Mz) equals • 7 "hectares or 1.8 acres • 
Source: Ministry of Natural Resources Yearbook, 
1983 
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Table 20. Indices of Production, Area and 
Yields for Rice in Honduras, 
1960-1982 (1960 = 100) 
---------------- M---------
'lE2E_Year Production Area Yield 
-----
1960/61 100.00 100.00 100.00 
1961/62 93.96 96.33 97.54 
1962/63 97.17 102.21 95.07 
1963/64 83.41 90.07 92.61 
1964/65 77.67 86.16 90.14 
1965/66 72.55 82.73 87.70 
1966/67 88.20 98.45 89.59 
1967/68 94.29 103.03 91.53 
1968/69 100.80 108.11 93.24 
1969/70 107.76 113.45 94.99 
1970/71 115.20 119.05 96.77 
1971/72 123.16 124.93 98.58 
1972/73 131.66 131.10 100.43 
1973/74 156.87 143.74 109.15 
1974/75 167.72 150.84 111.20 
1975/76 272.47 219.51 124.13 
1976/77 216.81 190.93 113.56 
1977/78 201.65 180.15 111.94 
1978/79 248.05 179.52 138.18 
1979/80 249.40 202.82 122.97 
1980/81 282.51 207.92 135.87 
1981/82 288.64 224.14 128.78 
1982/83 200.70 177.91 112.81 
-------------------------------
Source: Table 19. 
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Table 21. Production, Area and Yields for 
Sorghum in Honduras, 1960-1982. 
--P-roduction _______ Area-----yie1ds 
CroE_ Yea;;:.:r;;.__~ (Quintals).!/ ( Manzanas} ( QQ/Mz} 
---rrr --{ 2) - -----"Tir 
1960/61 
1961/62 
1962/63 
1963/64 
1964/65 
1965/66 
1966/67 
1967/68 
1968/69 
1969/70 
1970/71 
1971/72 
1972/73 
1973/74 
1974/75 
1975/76 
1976/77 
1977/78 
1978/79 
1979/80 
1980/81 
1981/82 
1982/83 
1,061,908 
1,033,387 
1,106,511 
1,139,988 
1,171,413 
972,460 
874,806 
909,939 
945,072 
980,205 
1,015,33f! 
1,050,471 
1,085,604 
895,763 
1,155,870 
1,152,566 
964,759 
776,952 
1,165,906 
840,115 
1,148,747 
1,278,197 
1,074,485 
61,382 
57,925 
60,202 
60,253 
60,227 
86,245 
42,533 
44,864 
47,195 
49,526 
51,857 
54,188 
56,519 
75,735 
61,181 
79,755 
87,065 
94,376 
105,495 
90,385 
88,439 
83,377 
54,431 
------------------------------~ 
~/ one quintal (QQ) equals 100 lbs. 
17.30 
17.84 
18 •. 38 
18.92 
19.45 
11.28 
20.57 
20.28 
20.02 
19.79 
19.58 
19.39 
19.21 
11.83 
18.89 
14.45 
11.08 
8.23 
11.05 
9.29 
12.99 
15.33 
19.74 
11 One manzana (Mz) equals .7 hectares or 1.8 acres. 
Source: Ministry of Natural Resources Yearbook, 
1983. 
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Table 22. Indices of Production Area and Yields 
for sorghum in Honduras, 1960-1982 
----------·--------- --------------------
~E£12._ Year Production Area Yields 
---rrr------r:rr----- (3}-
1960/61 100.00 100.00 100.00 
1961/62 97.32 94.37 103.12 
1962/63 104.20 98.08 106.24 
1963/64 107.35 98.16 109.36 
1964/65 110.31 98.12 112.43 
1965/66 91.58 140.51 65.18 
1966/67 82.38 69.29 118.89 
1967/68 85.69 73.09 117.24 
1968/69 89.00 76.89 115.75 
1969/70 92.31 80.68 114.40 
1970/71 95.61 84.48 113.18 
1971/72 98.92 88.28 112.06 
1972/73 102.23 92.08 111.03 
1973/74 82.83 123.38 75.24 
1974/75 108.85 99.67 109.21 
1975/76 108.53 129.93 85.53 
1976/77 90.85 141.84 64.05 
1977/78 73.17 153.75 47.59 
1978/79 109.80 171.87 73.89 
1979/80 79.11 147.25 53.73 
1980/81 108.18 144.08 75.08 
1981/82 120.37 135.83 88.61 
1982/83 101.18 88.68 114.11 
---------- ---------
Source: Table 21. 
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in the 1960s, dropped in the early 1970s to a rate of 1.89 
percent, then increased slightly up to 3.2 percent in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s. This is not a strong aggregate 
performance, however, during certain subperiods some crops 
did perform at respectable rates of growth. Corn grew at 
a promising rate of growth in the 1960s (4.2 percent), then 
declined sharply in the early 1970s (1.0 percent) and then 
just as sharply rose again in the late 1970s and early 
1980s (5.0 percent). The growth in corn output in the 1960s 
was due both to area expansion and yield increases, the 
stagnant growth in the early 1970s derived from sharp 
declines in yield while the rapid growth and recovery in 
the past six years up to 1982 was due exclusively to high 
yield increases. Fluctuations in weather no doubt played 
a major role in influencing the yield performances over time. 
Poor weather very likely prejudiced yields in the early 1970s 
while much better weather conditions in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s contributed to much higher yield increases for 
corn. Increased attention to extension activities and the 
supply of credit may also have made a difference in the more 
recent period along with more favorable prices growing out 
of Honduras• role in supplying increased black market demand 
from war-torn Nicaragua and El Salvador. 
Beans experienced modest growth in the 1960s, a disastrous 
decline in the early 1970s and a recovery for the more recent 
period. Throughout the longer time span of the decade of 
the 1960s and of the 1970s bean production and yields have 
been unimpressive. 
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Rice presents an interesting contrast over time. During 
the 1960s it records stagnant growth and negative yields. 
As we shall see shortly, this period also registered substan-
tial rice imports, a finding consistent with this unimpressive 
performance in domestic output. In the first half of the 
1970s, however, there was a veritable explosion in rice 
output. This came largely from area increases rather than 
yields. In the more recent period we see a negative 
performance overall, due to declines in area and yields. 
The growth performance of rice is by far the most volatile 
of all crops suggesting its vulnerability to changing weather 
and market conditions. 
A final feature in Table 14 merits comment and this is 
the marked and obvious substitution of land among crops 
through time. As one moves from the 1960s to the early 
1970s (from Column 2 to Column 4) one can see very large 
increases in area recorded for rice and sorghum and a sharp 
decline in area for beans. As we move from the early 1970s 
to the late 70s and early 80s (from Column 4 to Column 5) 
we can see a reversal of this pattern in area substitution 
with beans growing rapidly and, very likely, at the expense 
of area devoted to rice and sorghum, both of which registered 
sharp declines. 
These findings suggest first that differential prices 
and incentives emerge among these crops over time, promoting 
the expansion or contraction of specific crops according to 
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sharply different relative rates of return. Second, given 
r.he generally poor productivity record recorded for all 
crops over any sustained period of time, it is difficult 
to expand the output of one crop except at the expense 
(in land area) of another crop. Thus one sees certain crop-
specific spurts of output for relatively short periods of 
time rather than a generalized sustained expansion of basic 
grains as a whole. 
3. Basic Grains: Forei n Trade Trends and Indices 
o Comparative Advantage and Nom~nal Protect~on 
Tables 23 through 28 assemble information on the foreign 
trade trends for the basic grain crops in Honduras. These 
trends offer insights into the performance of the sector 
that compliment the trends in domestic production and 
productivity discussed in the previous section. Tables 23 
and 25 sharply portray the contrasting roles of basic grains 
in the 1960s and the 1970s. In the earlier decade, Honduras 
was exporting a substantial amount of corn and beans, while 
imports of these items were marginal either in absolute terms 
or as a percent of domestic production. For corn and beans, 
exports represented a substantial portion of domestic output 
during this period reaching between 30 to 50 percent of 
domestic output for beans and averaging 12 to 13 percent for 
corn (Table 26). This activity grew out of Honduras' role 
as a principal supplier of domestic foodstuffs within the early 
years of the Central American Common Market. 
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Table 23. Volume of Basic Grai7 Imports in 
Honduras, 1960-1982l 
Year Corn Beans Rice Sorghum 
( 1) ( 2) ( 3) (4) 
1960 184 25 11 393 312 
1961 1,655 73 1,755 2,759 
1962 147 98 894 223 
1963 881 166 1,863 164 
1964 868 101 1,161 150 
1965 1,920 139 1,488 75 
1966 1,105 731 7,829 277 
1967 3,436 107 6,011 2,233 
1968 1,969 61 7,211 226 
1969 223 48 9,116 47 
1970 449 4 10,119 435 
1971 495 4 2,659 5 
1972 107 4 4,513 5 
1973 1,894 172 20 24 
1974 367 97 1,187 6 
1975 42,986 387 10,615 21 
1976 665 4 1,344 15 
1977 12,813 156 2,044 4 
1978 37,116 161 4,383 20 
1979 7,393 298 4,900 9 
1980 48,284 2,771 3,804 1 
1981 17,669 7 1,684 25 
1982 5,706 57 2,752 
~/ In thousands ('000) of kilograms (i.e. metric 
tons) 
Source: Central Bank of Honduras, Department of 
Economic Studies. 
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Table 24. Basic Grain Imports as a Percent 
of Total Production oJ Basic Grains 
in Honduras, 1960-821 
Calendar 
Year Corn Beans Rice 
( 1) (2) (3) 
1960 .1% .0% 10.9% 
1961 .6 .2 14.7 
1962 .1 .2 7.2 
1963 .3 .3 17.6 
1964 .3 .2 21.9 
1965 .7 .4 16.1 
1966 .3 1.4 69.8 
1967 1.0 .2 50.1 
1968 .6 .1 56.2 
1969 o.o .1 66.5 
1970 .1 .1 69.0 
1971 .1 .o 17.0 
1972 o.o .o 26.9 
1973 .a .5 0.1 
1974 .1 .3 5.7 
1975 11.9 1.2 30.6 
1976 .2 o.o 4.9 
1977 3.1 .5 8.0 
1978 7.1 .4 13.9 
1979 2.3 .9 15.4 
1980 12.4 7.7 10.6 
1981 3.7 o.o 4.6 
1982 1.3 .1 10.8 
11 To convert import quantities {i.e. 
metric tons) into the same units as 
production data {i.e. quintales) we 
used the following equivalent measure: 
one metric ton equals 22 quintales. 
Source: Derived from data in Tables 15, 
1 7 , 19 and 2 3 • 
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Table 25. Volume of Basic Graiq Exports in 
Honduras, 1960-1982!/ 
Year Corn Beans Rice Sorg~um 
-------- ...,.<-=-1 >.------rrr---nr-------r 4 
1960 17,528 9,409 456 283 
1961 9,433 12,016 216 128 
1962 40,198 13,483 135 498 
1963 23,199 14,951 108 796 
1964 51,902 17,062 37 1,706 
1965 65,386 22,585 1,499 1,674 
1966 44,756 16,497 97 94 
1967 25,456 16,646 233 331 
1968 44,168 21,778 1,943 78 
1969 14,724 17,812 10 173 
1970 15,013 9,268 310 
1971 13,252 12,388 
1972 8,294 10,842 499 
1973 1,144 989 4 20 
1974 213 6,133 2,464 
1975 3,373 
1976 17,447 1,353 8,117 
1977 516 2,316 
1978 2 80 
1979 379 30 
1980 1 
1981 340 2,757 
1982 6,402 2,615 
·----~ ------------------
~j In thousands 
tons). 
(I 000) of kilograms (i.e. metric 
Source: Same as Table 23. 
Table 26. 
Year 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
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Basic Grain Exports as a Percent of Total 
Basic Grains in Honduras, 1960-82!/ 
Corn Beans Rice 
----rrr------(2} ---(~ 
7.2% 
3.6 
14.3 
8.1 
15.6 
23.2 
13.3 
7.6 
13.1 
4.4 
4.4 
3.9 
2.4 
.3 
.o 
.o 
4.5 
1.2 
.o 
1.2 
.o 
.1 
1.5 
23.8% 
28.2 
30.0 
29.9 
29.5 
57.7 
31.0 
32.9 
45.4 
39.2 
21.7 
30.8 
28.8 
2.q 
18.4 
10.4 
4.4 
7.8 
.2 
.1 
.o 
.5 
5.9 
3.6% 
1.8 
1.1 
1.0 
.4 
16.2 
.9 
1.9 
15.2 
.1 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.0 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
.o 
----~--------------------
1/ To measure export data and production 
- data in same units, see note to Table 24. 
source: Derived from basic data in Tables 
15, 17, 19 and 25. 
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In the 1970s this changed first through Honduras with-
drawing from the regional commonmarket and secondly through 
a decline in its exports and a rise in imports for corn, 
beans and rice. In the case of rice, imports represented 
a substantial portion of domestic production in the 1960s 
(from 50 to 70 percent); however, this relative share 
declined substantially in the 1970s (Table 24). This pattern 
for rice is consistent with the substantial rise in domestic 
output recorded in the early 1970s as domestic supply replaced 
imports. In this sense rice made a contribution to the 
saving of foreign exchange in the early to mid 1970s over 
what would have been expended without this rise in domestic 
output. 
The case of corn was less clear. In the 1960s the net 
trade balance for corn favored exports, substantially so. 
Corn exports represented a significant proportion of total 
output for many years during that earlier decade. In the 
1970s Honduras lpst its export trend in corn and, by the 
end of the 1970s, began to import corn in large quantities 
(as compared to earlier years). Still this importation of 
corn rarely represented a significant proportion of its 
output except for two years (1975 and 1980) when it reached 
12 percent of output (Table 24, Column 1). Yet in this 
latter period corn output grew at roughly 5.00 per year 
(Table 14, Column 5) with substantial increases in yields, 
following a period of relative stagnation in the early 1970s. 
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Thus corn activity shifted from being a partially successful 
export commodity in the 1960s to relatively self-sufficient 
production for the domestic market alone in the early 1970s 
and becoming, in the most recent period, a marginal importer 
to make up for shortfalls in meeting growing domestic demand. 
While yield and output grew in the late 70s and early 80s, 
there was an actual decline in area devoted to corn production. 
The net result was an occasional need for imports to meet 
growing local demand. 
Bean trade and production trends fit a more consistent 
pattern. In the 1960s Honduras was a significant exporter 
of beans with exports representing between 30 to 40 of local 
bean production. By the 1970s this trend had shifted to 
one emphasizing a virtual disappearance of exports and a 
marginally growing need for imports. Throughout this period 
bean production and yields have stagnated, proving incapable 
of serving domestic demand effectively. Of all the basic 
grains crops beans register the most unimpressive growth 
record throughout this period. Given the difficulties of 
importing beans (there are no well established world trade 
markets in beans), this stagnant domestic growth no doubt 
is reflected in a decline in bean consumption in local diets 
in comparison to other basic grains (especially corn and rice) • 
Tables 27 and 28 round out this discussion by presenting 
indices of comparative advantage and nominal protection for 
basic grains. In Table 27 the ratio of the farmgate price 
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(estimated by the central bank staff in the Economic Studies 
Department) to the CIF import price indicates the comparative 
advantage of Honduras in growing basic grains. If this 
ratio is greater than one, Honduras is incurring an opportunity 
cost in terms of economic efficiency (in the use of 
scarce resources) by growing the crop locally instead of 
importing it. If the ratio is less than one, Honduras enjoys 
a comparative advantage in using local resources to grow the 
crop rather than importing it and transferring local resources 
to other uses. Honduras has enjoyed a comparative advantage 
in corn production throughout this two decade period. The 
same can largely be said for beans. The case of rice is 
more interesting. Honduras did not enjoy a comparative 
advantage in growing rice in the 1960s (Table 27, Column 3). 
This is consistent with the fact that Honduras imported most 
of its supply for domestic consumption with imports ranging 
as high as 60 to 70 percent of local production during this 
period (Table 24, Column 3). In the 1970s, however, Table 
27 shows that the ratio of farmgate price to import price 
(CIF) for rice began dropping below one, indicating that 
rice producers were beginning to acquire a comparative 
advantage in producing their crop in competition with imports. 
As a result domestic rice output grew substantially in the 
early to mid 1970s (Table 14) and rice imports as a percent 
of total production began to decline (Table 24, Column 3). 
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Table 27. Ratio of Farmgate Price to Import Price 
for Basic Grains in Honduras, 1961-1982 
----
________ a ______ .. ______________ 
Year Corn Beans Rice ·--~[~~u~ rrr-----m -r:n 
1961 .66 .75 1.12 .70 
1962 .56 .69 1.07 1.04 
1963 • 74 .78 1.13 .92 
1964 .87 .88 1.15 .84 
1965 .so .95 1./.4 .49 
1966 .76 1.02 l. '20 l.l8 
1967 .81 1.24 1.27 .96 
1968 .so .86 1. 39 .90 
1969 .40 .55 1.79 1.11 
1970 .42 .38 1.60 .95 
1971 .27 .37 1.30 .28 
1972 .29 .38 1.08 .42 
1973 • 76 .91 1.65 .34 
1974 .27 .84 .46 .23 
1975 .68 .85 .65 .16 
1976 .34 .46 .60 .23 
1977 .97 .74 1.10 .24 
1978 .94 .56 .92 .19 
1979 .84 .38 .99 .29 
1980 .64 .38 .46 .29 
1981 .69 .23 .8'2 .18 
1982 .20 .51 1. /.1 n.a. 
------------------
-----
Source: Derived from basic price series in IHMA and 
Central Bank of Honduras, Department of 
Economics Studies. 
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Table 28. Ratio of Farmgate Price to Export Price 
for Basic Grains in Honduras, 1961-1982 
----------------- ------------------------
Year Corn Beans Rice So(~~~ 
-rl} ---rrr -m-
1961 1.09 1.26 2.28 1.22 
1962 .89 1.09 1. 75 1.06 
1963 .88 1.02 1.58 1.01 
1964 .93 1.03 1.62 1.37 
1965 .87 1.08 1.52 .60 
1966 1.03 1.17 2.26 1.33 
1967 .97 1.06 1. 71 1.65 
1968 1.08 .98 1.01 1. 33 
1969 1.04 .99 .76 1.57 
1970 1.08 1.06 1.92 
1971 1.00 .94 
1972 .88 1.00 1.58 
1973 .43 .79 1.98 1.69 
1974 .92 .41 1.10 
1975 .90 
1976 1.11 .96 .98 
1977 1.27 .99 
1978 .05 1.25 
1979 .66 .10 
1980 .10 
1981 .58 .45 
1982 .71 .52 
-------------------------------------
Source: Same as Table 27 • 
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Finally Table 28 rounds out this discussion by presenting 
the ratio of farmgate prices to export FOB prices for the 
same crop. This is a rough proxy for a nominal protection 
coefficient. If this ratio is greater than one then the 
crop enjoys protection (i.e. a subsidy) since farmers receive 
a higher price than the internationally traded price. If 
the ratio is less than one then farmers no longer enjoy 
protection and, depending upon the appropriate margin for 
marketing and processing costs, may be experiencing negative 
protection (i.e. implicit taxation) through unusually low 
prices in comparison to the FOB export price of the crop. 
The results in Table 28 suggest that basic grains 
in the 1960s largely received net protection. In the 1970s 
this began to decline for corn and beans. In the most 
recent period it would appear that some degree of implicit 
taxation may have occurred for these two crops, however, 
several caveats are in order. The wide fluctuation in these 
coefficients in the more recent years suggest that the FOB 
prices used in the estimation probably reflected very thin 
and unrepresentative markets. Also no explicit deduction for 
marketing and processing costs is possible so that the results 
are at best rough proxies. For example a ratio of .80 
(rather than 1.00) may represent the breakeven point between 
protection (i.e. subsidization) and implicit taxation of 
producers once one deducts the necessary margin for marketing 
and processing costs implicit in the prices used here. 
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The most we can say from the evidence on prices in Table 28 
is that the degree of protection in the 1960s has declined 
in the 1970s, particularly in the more recent period. 
4. The Institutional Setting Conditioning Basic Grains 
Pricing Performance: IHMA -- The Honduran Marketing 
Institute for Basic Grains 
The major policies designed to enhance the performance 
of basic grains have been directed largely through IHMA. 
The main thrust of policies has been to stimulate produc-
tion and raise farm income through an announced guaranteed 
price system, to stabilize retail and wholesale prices and 
to reduce import dependency. Each of these areas will be 
discussed below. 
(a) Price Policy 
The guaranteed farmgate price policy was designed 
to improve farm income and stimulate production. Until 1980 
the maximum price a farmer would receive from IHMA was 
announced at the beginning of each crop season. After 1980 
the minimum price paid by IHMA was used as the announced 
price. This change was undertaken because apparently very 
few farmers actually received the maximum price under the 
former scheme. 
The effectiveness of this policy can be seen and 
interpreted in two ways through the results in Table 29. 
This table presents the ratio of the average annual farmgate 
price (estimated by the Economic Studies Department of the 
Central Bank) to the maximum-minimum (after 1980) prices 
Year 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
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Table 29: Ratio of Estimated Farm-gate Prices 
to Maximum and Minimum Prices Paid 
by IHMA, 1965-1982 
Corn Beans Rice 
Tf) (2) T3) 
1.11 1. 45 1.96 
.96 1. 48 1. 80 
1.01 1.21 1. 99 
.98 1. 27 2.21 
.94 1. 33 2.94 
1. 02 1.21 2.91 
.95 1. 20 2.49 
.95 1.17 2.23 
1.02 1.20 2.05 
.84 .88 1. 50 
.64 .99 1. 35 
.85 .83 l. 66 
.90 .92 1. 64 
.80 .86 1. 63 
.88 .93 1. 49 
.86 .75 1. 51 
.79 .57 1. 55 
.81 .61 .96 
Source: IHMA files and Economic Studies Department, 
Sor9:hum 
{ 4) 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
.71 
1. 22 
l. 08 
1. 05 
1. 00 
.90 
.92 
.87 
.56 
Central Bank 
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paid by IRMA. If this ratio is less than one then farmers 
would have been better off selling to IRMA. With a ratio 
greater than one farmers would have been better off selling 
to a private wholesaler. 
Farmers selling corn over the period 1965-1974, if 
they could obtain the maximum price from IRMA, would have 
been just as well off selling to either market. However, 
from 1974-1979 corn farmers could have improved their income 
by selling only to IRMA. In the case of beans, the correct 
action was to sell to IRMA during 1974-1979, but farmers 
appear to have been better off selling to the private 
market before 1974. In 1980 the policy was changed to a 
minimum price policy. Comparison of the farmgate price 
to the minimum price reveals that farmers should have sold 
beans, corn and sorghum to IHl1A since the lowest price from 
IRMA exceeded the farmgate price. Rice farmers, regardless 
of the type of price policy followe~ would not have been 
inclined to sell to IRMA, if the data in Table 29 accurately 
reflects the differential prices from IRMA and non-IRMA 
sources. These findings are consistent with the results of 
the separate study by Loria and Cuevas on marketing channels 
selected by basic grains farmers. 
to market their crop through IRMA. 
Very few rice farmers chose 
Due to limited storage 
and marketing capacity, IRMA can only purchase between 10 
to 15 percent of the marketable surplus of basic grains. 
Hence, while prices may induce farmers to try to sell to IHMA 
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there is a structural constraint that may prevent this from 
happening. If a farmer realizes there is little chance of 
consumating his sale to IHMA then the announced price has 
minimal impact even if this price is above the market price. 
(b) Price Stabilization Scheme 
The second policy initiative undertaken by IHMA 
has been directed towards reducing price fluctuations at 
both the wholesale and retail levels. This has been under-
taken by purchasing and selling grains at selected periods 
of the year. In principle, IH!1A is expected to buy grain 
when supply is plentiful (prices are low) and sell grain 
when supply is short (prices high). This raises the price 
during periods of excess supply and lowers the price during 
periods of grain shortage so that the monthly price stays 
relatively constant. 
The effectiveness of this policy was evaluated through 
the calculation of the coefficient of variation (CV) for 
each basic grain crop on a yearly basis at both the wholesale 
and retail level (Tables 30 and 31) • The coefficient of 
variation measures the average fluctuation of average monthly 
prices around the average annual price. The monthly price 
series was made available through IHMA's files on retail 
and wholesale prices for basic grains. We then compared the 
average CV from 1966-1976 with the average CV from 1977-1982 
for each crop at both the retail and wholesale levels. These 
Table 30. Mean, Standard Deviation and Coefficient of Variation 
for Basic Grain Retail Prices in Honduras, 1966-1982 
---Corn Beans Rice Sorg:hum 
Std. Std. Std. Std. 
Year Mean Dev. cv Mean Dev. cv Mean Dev. cv Mean Dev. cv 
( 1 ) (2) {3) (4) ( 5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
1966 8.42 1.24 .15 19.00 2.67 .14 26.67 1.67 .06 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1967 8.92 1.31 .15 22.50 2.50 .11 25.58 1.51 .06 n.a • n.a. n.a. 
1968 9.08 1.56 .17 21.50 1.68 .08 24.83 1.53 • 06 n.a • n.a. n.a. 
1969 8.08 .52 .06 21.00 2.41 .11 24.41 • 79 .03 n.a. n.a • n.a. 
1970 10.83 1.64 .15 23.50 2.97 .13 28.33 2.46 • 09 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1971 14.00 2.56 .18 21.92 2.78 .13 32.92 4.50 .14 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1972 8.50 1.24 .15 20.92 2.23 .11 30.42 1.73 .06 n.a. n.a. n.a. I 
1973 9.08 1.31 .14 30.67 4.79 .16 28.83 1.34 .05 n.a. n.a. n.a. -...J 
1974 10.50 1.09 .10 30.00 3.13 .10 37 .oo 4.47 .12 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. I 
1975 18.08 6.10 .34 31.67 3.23 .10 47.33 1.23 .03 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1976 11.83 .72 .06 31.50 2.88 .09 47.08 2.19 .05 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1977 21.50 4.38 .20 42.33 7.90 .19 52.58 4.14 .08 25.92 5.02 .19 
1978 19.30 1. 70 .09 46.55 8.57 .18 60.56 4.67 .08 20.89 3.95 .19 
1979 17.19 1.47 .09 40.36 7.97 .20 65.09 2.74 .04 18.45 2.46 .13 
1980 24.33 3.43 .14 89.11 15.91 .18 69.22 1.09 .02 24.22 2.73 .11 
1981 21.75 1.36 .06 75.08 5.40 .07 75.08 3.65 .05 23.17 1.45 .06 
1982 20.42 1.44 .07 53.17 8.68 .16 77.67 1.67 .02 21.92 2.94 .13 
Source: IHMA files on retail prices. 
Table 31. Mean, Standard Deviation and Coefficient of Variation for 
Basic Grain Wholesale Prices in Honduras, 1966-1982 
Corn Beans Rice Sor~hum 
Std. Std. Std. Std. 
Year Mean Dev. cv Mean Dev. cv Mean Dev. cv Mean Dev. cv {1) ( 2) (3) (4) ( 5) (6) ( 7) (8) (9) (10) 01) ( 12) 
1966 5.04 • 39 .08 17.39 5.19 .30 23.31 1.65 .07 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1967 7.27 1.39 .19 17.76 3.06 .17 21.34 1.64 .08 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1968 6.82 1.11 .16 16.96 2.01 .12 19.10 1.50 .08 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1969 5.45 .56 .10 15.18 1. 75 .12 17.49 1.09 .06 n.a. n.a. n.a • 
1970 6.94 2. 32 .33 17.86 4.9 • 27 20.50 1.19 .06 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1971 5.80 .528 .09 13.58 1.41 .10 27.31 3.39 .12 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1972 6.52 .96 .15 16.40 2.88 .18 25.35 1.55 .06 n.a. n.a. n.a. I 
1973 7.64 1.25 .16 26.03 4.68 .18 23.45 1.09 .OS n.a. n.a. n.a. ._,J 
1974 9.07 .90 .10 24.76 3.16 .13 32.13 4.10 .13 n.a. n.a. n.a. 1-' I 
1975 14.65 4.07 .28 26.16 3.19 .12 41.50 4.06 .10 n.a. n.a. n.a . 
1976 9.84 .715 .07 26.21 1.92 • 07 40.00 1. 73 .04 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1977 17.81 3.34 .19 37.27 7.70 .21 46.59 3.36 .07 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1978 15.86 2.73 .17 38.91 9.24 .24 52.29 2.99 .06 5.36 2.39 .16 
1979 14.96 1. 34 .09 36.87 10.36 .28 57.07 1.90 .03 14.92 2.13 .14 
1980 21.54 8.91 .41 78.31 13.40 .17 60.20 .75 .01 20.54 2.75 .13 
1981 18.45 1.22 .07 59.17 8.77 .15 66.29 4.03 .06 17.40 1.29 .07 
1982 17.21 1. 74 .10 41.08 4.71 .11 68.71 1. 77 .03 17.14 2.41 .14 
----------~--·--------------
Source: IHMA files on wholesale prices. 
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periods were chosen because after 1976, the price stabili-
zation scheme was undertaken with a more concentrated effort 
within IRMA. The coefficients of variation are reported 
in Tables 30 and 31. IHMA was apparently only successful 
in stabilizing the price of rice at the wholesale level. 
The average CV for rice wholesale prices decreased dramatically 
after 1976, while for beans and corn wholesale price fluc-
tuations increased even more after IHMA's intervention in 
the grain markets. Conceivably weather variations may have 
been more extreme and uneven during this period. At the 
retail level IHMA was more successful as retail prices for 
corn and rice varied less on a yearly basis after 1976, 
while for beans retail price fluctuations increased after 
1976. 
This analysis of price variation reveals that wholesale 
prices have varied more than retail prices for all grains. 
A major reason for this contrast is very likely due to 
the additional supply provided by imports at various times 
of the year to smooth out retail prices. This may explain 
why retail price fluctuations have been reduced for corn and 
rice while retail price fluctuations for beans have increased. 
Corn and rice can be handled through well established inter-
national trade channels. Beans cannot. 
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(c) Reduction of Imports 
IHMA's performance in reducing imports has also 
been mixed. Earlier examination of the import data (Tables 
23 and 24) revealed that corn imports have increased since 
1977, while bean and sorghum imports have been steadily 
declining over the same period. Rice imports have remained 
fairly constant in absolute terms, however, with the increase 
in domestic rice production, the constant absolute value of 
rice imports have been declining as a percent of rice 
production. 
IHMA generally imports basic grains to make up for 
production shortfalls. Whether Honduras should import more 
or less of a grain crop could be evaluated according to 
comparative advantage criteria. We already established 
the fact that Honduras has a comparative advantage in producing 
corn, beans and sorghum and is apparently gaining more 
efficient production in rice from our interpretation of 
data in Table 27. Additional data can be brought to bear 
on this by looking at the ratio of retail prices (of basic 
grains) to CIF import prices. This is presented in Table 32. 
If we accept the need for a marketing margin here between 
the retail and the CIF price the results in Table 32 suggest 
that, except for certain extreme outlier years (such as 
1977 and 1978), corn, beans and sorghum should not have been 
imported in any great amount, if at all, in the last seven 
years. The retail/CIF ratio is less than one or close enough 
Year 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
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Table 32. Ratio of Retail Prices to CIF Prices 
for Basic Grains in Honduras, 1966-1982 
Corn 
TI) 
1. 02 
1.10 
1.13 
.57 
.73 
.60 
.40 
1. 00 
.37 
1. 28 
.43 
1. 89 
1. 68 
1.11 
1.19 
1. 09 
.29 
Beans 
(2) 
1. 24 
1. 77 
1.11 
.72 
.52 
.48 
.46 
1.55 
1. 36 
1. 30 
.69 
1. 36 
1. 05 
.57 
1.12 
.55 
.88 
Rice 
~ 
1. 77 
1. 63 
1. 73 
2.12 
2.22 
1. 90 
1. 47 
2.11 
• 75 
1. 26 
1.12 
1. 95 
1. 71 
1. 80 
.83 
1. 49 
2.16 
Sorghum 
(4) 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n. a. 
n.a. 
n. a . 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
1. 75 
.34 
.46 
.60 
.51 
.28 
Source: Derived from retail price data in IHMA and farm-qate 
price data estimated by the Central Bank of Honduras, 
Department of Economic Studies. 
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to one if one makes allowance for a presumed small marketing 
margin. 
The case is different for rice. Here the reta~l/CIF 
ratio is considerably above one throughout most of the entire 
period. Consumers are paying substantially more than the 
CIF cost of rice. This suggests substantial protection of 
rice production (which we discovered earlier) with the 
consumer bearing the cost through higher prices. In the 
short run consumer welfare would be enhanced by allowing 
for greater imports. In the long run, however, Honduras 
could try to move ahead with an import-substitution program 
in rice. This is in fact what is happening. Our earlier 
analysis discovered that Honduras has just barely achieved 
a comparative advantage in producing rice (see Table 27 
and related discussion in text). It is the basic grain 
crop in which Honduras had the least natural comparative 
advantage (in the 1960s) and considerable investment and 
development were necessary to lower costs. Imports still 
occur but at a declining share of total production so that 
Honduras is apparently reducing its import dependence on 
this crop. However consumers are still paying a high 
price for this progress as seen in Table 32. 
(d) Marketing Margins 
An import issue in the basic grains sector concerns 
the costs and efficiency of marketing. This issue was discussed 
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at length with respect to coffee in the first half of this 
report. This final section rounds out this discussion by 
focusing on the issue of marketing margins for basic grains. 
Tables 32, 33 and 34 summarize the available data on 
marketing margins. Table 32, Columns 1 through 4, shows 
that the farrngate price, on the average, generally accounted 
for a higher share of the retail price in the earlier period 
(1966-76) than in the more recent period (1977-82) for 
corn, beans and rice. As a result the gross marketing 
margins (in columns 5-7) for these crops have also increased 
(on average) from the earlier to the later period. 
Table 33 offers further insights by showing that within 
this gross marketing margin there has been an unusual 
divergent behavior over time between the trend for the first 
stage marketing margin (from farmgate to wholesaler) and the 
trend for the second stage marketing margin (from the 
wholesaler to the retailer). The second stage marketing 
margins have declined substantially over time for the three 
major crops (Columns 5-7) • It has been the rapid increase 
in the first stage marketing margin (Columns 1-3) that 
accounts for the rise in the overall gross marketing margin 
identified above. Table 34 merely portrays these same 
results from another perspective in which the first and 
second stage marketing margins are presented as a percent 
of the gross margin. 
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Table 32. Ratios of Farmgate and Wholesale Prices to 
Retail Prices and Marketing Margins for 
Basic Grains in Honduras, 1966-1982 
Gross Marketing Mar in 
Ratio of Farmgate Price l 
- Fa~gat~Ret~il] 
to Retail Price Pr~ce Pr~ce 
Year Corn Beans R~ce sor9:. Corn Beans R~ce Sorg. (1) ( 2) ( 3) (4) { 5) (6) (7) (8} 
1966 .49 .82 .67 n.a. .51 .18 .33 n.a. 
1967 .74 .70 .77 n.a. .26 .30 .23 n.a. 
1968 .70 .61 .80 n.a. • 30 .39 .20 n.a. 
1969 .69 .77 .84 n.a. .31 .23 .16 n.a. 
1970 .55 .72 • 7 3 n.a. .45 .28 .27 n.a. 
1971 .44 .76 .68 n.a. .56 .24 .32 n.a. 
1972 .73 .so .74 n.a. .27 .20 .26 n.a. 
1973 .76 .59 .78 n.a. .24 .41 .22 n.a • 
1974 .73 .63 .63 n.a. • 27 .37 .37 n.a • 
1975 .54 .65 .51 n.a. • 46 .35 .49 n.a • 
1976 .so .65 .54 n.a. • 20 .35 .46 n.a. 
1977 .52 .56 .56 n.a. .48 .44 .44 n.a • 
1978 .56 .54 .53 .56 • 44 .46 .47 .44 
1979 .75 .66 .55 .64 .25 .34 .45 .36 
1980 .54 .33 .56 • 53 .46 .67 .44 .47 
1981 .61 .42 .55 .61 .39 .58 .45 .39 
1982 .68 .56 .55 .68 .32 .44 .45 .32 
Source: Derived from basic price series in IHMA and Central Bank 
of Honduras, Department of Economic Studies. 
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Table 33. Changing Profile of First and Second Stage 
Marketing Margins f~l Basic Grains in 
Honduras, 1966-1982-
------------First -stage------------ --second-Stage _____ 
__ --~<!,rketing Mar<r!,ns£/ ·- ____ Marke~!_~ Margins£/ 
Year Corn Beans Rice So~. Corn Beans Rice Sorg. ( 1 y----r2r c 3} \4 -----"TIT < 6 J < 1} --rs-r-
1966 11% 10% 20% 40% 8% 13% 
1967 8 9 6 18 21 17 
1968 5 18 -3 25 21 23 
1969 
-2 1 -8 33 22 28 
1970 9 4 0 36 24 27 
1971 
-3 -14 15 59 38 17 
1972 4 -2 9 23 22 17 
1973 8 26 3 16 15 19 
1974 13 20 24 14 17 13 
1975 27 18 37 19 17 12 
1976 3 18 31 17 17 15 
1977 31 32 33 17 12 11 
1978 26 30 33 18 18 16 14 26 
1979 12 25 33 17 13 9 12 19 
1980 35 55 31 32 ll 12 13 15 
1981 24 37 33 14 15 21 12 25 
1982 16 21 33 10 16 23 12 22 
---------------------.. -------------·------·-----
l/ The first and second stage marketing margins in the table add 
up to the gross marketing margins set forth in Table 30 for 
the respective crops in question. 
11 First stage margin is the markup between farmgate and 
wholesale prices; second stage margin is the markup between 
wholesale and retail prices. 
Source: Derived from Table 31. 
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Table 34. Changing Profile of First Stage and Second 
Stage Marketing Margins as a Percent of 
the Gross Margin of Basic Grains in 
Honduras, 1966-1982 
------First stage Marketing-----second -stage·-Markefing ___ 
Margins as a % Margins as a % 
of ~ross Mar~inl/ ----~f Gross MaE£lin!/ 
Year Corn Beans Rice SorT; Corn Beans RJ.ce SorS::-( 1) 
--rrr (3) (4 (5) (6) -- (7) -(8)-
1966 21.6% 55.6% 60.6% 78.4% 44.4% 39.4% 
1967 30.8 30 .o 26.1 69.2 70.0 73.9 
1968 16.7 46.2 -15.0 83.3 53.8 115.0 
1969 
-6.5 4.4 -5o.o 106.5 95.6 150.0 
1970 20.0 14.3 0 80.0 85.7 100.0 
1971 5.4 -58.3 46.9 94.6 158.3 53.1 
1972 14.8 -10.0 34.6 85.2 110.0 65.4 
1973 33.3 63.4 13.6 66.7 36.6 86.4 
1974 48.2 54.1 64.9 51.8 45.9 35.1 
1975 58.7 51.4 75.5 41.3 48.6 24.5 
1976 15.0 51.4 67.4 85.0 48.6 32.6 
1977 64.6 72.7 75.0 45.4 27.3 25.0 
1978 39.1 65.2 70.2 40.9% 40.9 34.8 29.8 59.1% 
1979 48.0 73.5 73.3 56.8 52.0 26.5 26.7 43.2 
1980 76.1 82.1 70.5 68.1 23.9 17.9 29.5 31.() 
1981 61.5 63.8 73.3 35.9 38.5 36.2 26.7 64.1 
1982 50.0 47.7 73.3 31.2 50.0 52.3 26.7 68.8 
-----------· 
!/ The gross margin in the difference between the farmgate price 
and the retail price. The first stage margin is the markup 
between wholesale and farmgate pricesr the second stage is the 
markup between wholesale and retail prices. The percentages 
in this table add up to 100 percent. 
Source: Derived from Tables 31 and 32. 
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An important implication of the above findings is that 
higher retail prices may not act as a stimulant for increased 
production if it is all absorbed in higher marketing margins. 
It would appear that beans and rice register the highest 
marketing margins in recent years. Corn generally records 
lower and presumably more efficient (i.e. competitive) margins. 
Further research and field studies are needed to identify 
the nature of these rising wholesale-farmgate margins. The 
study by Loria and Cuevas strongly suggests that there is 
substantial competition at the farmgate through multiple 
marketing channels. However the layer of intermediaries 
above this level may very likely represent less competitive 
and higher markups. 
5. Conclusion 
The basic grains sector has not experienced any substan-
tial productivity breakthrough on a sustained basis. Short 
spurts in output and improved yields have been recorded for 
specific crops for shorter periods of time. In the 1960s 
this sector engaged in substantial export activity however 
in the 1970s this trend disappeared and, on occasion, Honduras 
became a net importer of basic grains. 
Honduras does enjoy a comparative advantage in the 
production of corn and beans. It did not initially experience 
a comparative advantage in the production of rice but has 
recently achieved this status after an import substitution 
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effort in that crop. Given the rapid growth of the population 
and the income elasticity of demand for basic grains in a 
low income setting, it is likely that the aggregate demand 
for basic grains will frequently outstrip domestic supply 
unless more sustained yield increases can be maintained 
for more than short periods of time. 
A final puzzling feature of our investigation has 
identified an apparent marketing obstacle in that the first 
stage marketing margin between the farmgate and wholesale 
prices has grown appreciably in recent years. This raises 
important questions about the efficiency and competitiveness 
of the marketing chain at this stage. More research and 
analysis at the intermediary level is clearly called for 
to sort out the factors causing this widening marketing 
margin and identifying policy measures that could resolve 
this problem. 
